Conclusion

Finally, Strait Rituals returns to the three main lines of inquiry: Why did the two confrontations erupt in September 1954 and August 1958? How did each crisis unfold, from outbreak to resolution? What do the two crises reveal about the foreign relations of the PRC, US and ROC in the 1950s? A short thematic approach will be taken to bring all relevant elements together.

Roiling in Troubled Waters

After the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks ceased in December 1957, further talks were suspended indefinitely. On 23 August 1958, the PRC again targeted artillery barrages on Quemoy and Matsu, igniting another confrontation. However, on 6 September, both Zhou and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly announced possible peaceful measures and this led to the convening of the Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw from 15 September onwards. In particular, this chapter reviews the positions of the ROC, US and PRC just prior to the outbreak of the crisis and critical developments. Next, it scrutinizes the reactions of China, the US and Taiwan to this crisis and the speed of its resolution. Finally, the rationalizations given by China and the US seeking to justify their actions to their domestic public and in the international arena are considered.

Sustaining Linkages

Zhou’s conciliatory gesture in April 1955 at the Bandung Conference marked the end of the first showdown. Chapter 5 will investigate the sustaining linkages in US-PRC-ROC relations between May 1955 and December 1957 by appraising four areas: the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks (August 1955-December 1957), the ROC-PRC secret back-channels (1955-1957), the May 1957 Taiwan Riots, and the ROC and its fangong mission (1955-1957).

A Stillness at Taiwan Strait

The genesis of the Taiwan Straits Crises could be traced to 1950 when President Harry S. Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC and the ROC. In order to understand the origins and making of the contest over control of the Taiwan Strait, it is important to deal with the major developments in the foreign relations of the US, PRC and ROC from 1950 to April 1954. As the ROC was the most directly affected party right from the start, how the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan will also be examined.

The Warsaw Gambit

Once Zhou Enlai accepted Washington’s offer of restarting the negotiations in Warsaw, the clash retreated in urgency. This chapter, exploring developments from late-September to December 1958, wraps up the discussion of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. First, it analyses how the PRC, the US and the ROC related to each other and in the international arena in the final months of the crisis. Next, the ways which the PRC responded to third-party proposals from Britain, the Soviets and neutralist Asian countries are explained. It also explores ROC responses to Beijing and Washington’s consolidation of tacit accommodation. Another critical area of inquiry is the PRC-ROC engagement in secret back-channels. Finally, the positions of the three protagonists in the aftermath of the crisis are assessed.

From Yijiangshan to Bandung

On 18 January 1955, the PRC upped the ante by recovering the obscure Nationalist-controlled Yijiangshan islands as a prelude to occupying the neighboring Dachen islands. In a news conference on 16 March, Eisenhower publicly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. At the first Afro-Asian Conference held on 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, PRC premier Zhou Enlai announced that China was not averse to negotiating with the US over the Taiwan Strait. Zhou’s conciliatory gesture was quickly accepted by the US over virulent protests by the ROC. This chapter explores the motivations for the actions of China, the US and Taiwan. It further explicates on the development of Sino-US relations from the eve of the Yijiangshan campaign to the Bandung Conference.

The Geneva Road

Held from 26 April to 21 July 1954, the Geneva Conference was significant in providing a major diplomatic platform for the US and China to undertake negotiations and work out differences so as to reach an understanding on outstanding issues regarding the “Korean question” and the “question of restoring peace in Indochina.” The evolution of Sino-US relations during this conference and the implications such developments had on the straits are studied. Moreover, this chapter probes the actions Taiwan, not a participant in Geneva, took during this period and the impact such actions had in the unfolding of events.

Introduction

This chapter sets out the aims of this book, stating the main lines of inquiry. Next, a brief “state of the field” assessment on the historical problem of the Taiwan Strait crises will be made. It will examine how a reevaluation is pertinent with the availability of new sources and how such a new appraisal speaks about the deeper trends of historical questions of Sino-US relations. This is followed by a short content review and a discussion of the usage of Chinese and US sources.

Outbreak of the Crisis

On 3 September 1954, China launched a massive artillery bombardment on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, triggering the first crisis. This attack prompted the US to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on 2 December 1954. China also courted neutralist countries in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. This chapter focuses on the Geneva reverberations especially on developments in July and August 1954, which led to the eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. How China, the US and Taiwan acted following the outbreak of this crisis will be the next point of scrutiny.