Varieties of censorship: Hate speech, pornography, and the First Amendment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Cary Federman
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 761
Author(s):  
Jon B. Gould ◽  
Richard Abel ◽  
Richard Delgado ◽  
Jean Stefancic

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-232
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

This chapter explores the ways in which some progressives, in the years leading up to Trump’s election, had grown skeptical of expansive First Amendment protections, viewing them as impediments to the pursuit of equality objectives. Although some of that skepticism is understandable, the chapter details the multiple ways in which free speech and free press protections helped curtail some of Trump’s autocratic policies and practices. In doing so, the chapter argues that progressives, going forward, should not allow what it calls “First Amendment skepticism” to grow to the point that it undermines the amendment’s ability to shield democratic processes, dissenters, and vulnerable groups from future autocratic government officials in the Trump mold. The chapter ends with an exploration of future hate speech regulations. While it would be understandable for progressives, after Trump’s repeated use of hate speech, to call for greater regulations of such speech, the chapter urges progressives to be cautious in this area because of the real possibility that the regulations will be used by future government officials in the Trump mold to target and discriminate against both progressive viewpoints and racial and religious minorities.


Author(s):  
Norman Fischer

The striking down of the Stanford University Hate Speech Code on February 27, 1995 demonstrated the strong animus in U.S. First Amendment decisions against such codes. Judge Peter Stone, applying the U.S. Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. ruled, first, that the Stanford Code was too broad, and second, that the state cannot censor content by picking out some "fighting words" to prohibit. I argue that the moral basis for banning overbroad codes combines a nonconsequential emphasis on the value of liberty with a consequentialist analysis of what happens when liberty that should be protected is entangled in codes reflecting liberty that should not be protected. In contrast, the moral basis for content neutrality does not depend on consequentialist thinking, but shows that the very search for a moral basis for banning the purest acts of hateful speech logically makes the speech protected by elevating it to a viewpoint.


1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mark Miller ◽  
Julie Andsager

Hate speech tends to be covered as a campus issue with emphasis on speech codes, events and absence of discussion of First Amendment implications.


NASPA Journal ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Alan Neiger ◽  
Carolyn Palmer ◽  
Sophie Penney ◽  
Donald D. Gehring

As part of a larger study, the researchers collected campus codes prohibiting hate crimes, which were then reviewed by one of the authors, an attorney with extensive experience in First Amendment case law, to determine whether the codes presented constitutional problems. Based on this review, the authors developed a model policy that is content neutral and does not use language that could be viewed as unconstitutionally vague or broad. This model can provide institutions with guidelines for drafting constitutionally sound codes.


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