Bargaining, Compensating Wage Differentials, and Dualism of the Labor Market: Theory and Evidence for France

1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Daniel ◽  
Catherine Sofer
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Drasch ◽  
Martin Abraham

Mothers still earn substantially less than women without children; this discrepancy is often referred to as the motherhood wage penalty. This paper examines one possible explanation for this penalty: the willingness to accept lower-paying jobs that have more favorable characteristics that help women reconcile family and work. This idea was formulated based on the theory of compensating wage differentials (CWDs). A factorial survey is used to empirically examine the willingness to accept lower-paying jobs. An online survey comprised 398 women who interrupted employment due to family reasons. The results suggest that mothers are willing to accept lower wages for better job characteristics and that in addition to wages, non-monetary characteristics are also important in shaping the re-entry decision.


2015 ◽  
pp. 62-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Zhuravleva

This paper surveys the literature on public-private sector wage differentials for Russian labor market. We give an overview of the main results and problems of the existing research. The authors unanimously confirm that in Russia private sector workers receive higher wages relative to their public sector counterparts. According to different estimates the "premium" varies between 7 and 40%. A correct evaluation of this "premium" is subject to debate and is a particular case of a more general econometric problem of wage differentials estimation. The main difficulties are related to data limitations, self-selection and omitted variables. Reasons for the existence of a stable private sector "premium" in Russia are not fully investigated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Salamanca ◽  
Jan Feld

AbstractWe extend Becker’s model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not favoring firms.


ILR Review ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 642-654 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Dorsey ◽  
Norman Walzer

Competitive theory implies that compensating wage differentials will be paid to workers in hazardous employment, but only to the extent that employees are liable for risk. This prediction suggests that previous estimates of wage-risk premiums may be biased as a result of the failure to control for variations in workers' compensation benefits across states. The authors of this paper test an empirical model of compensating wage differentials that includes a measure of employer liability. For nonunion workers, they find that significant wage premiums are paid for an increased probability or severity of nonfatal injury; a slight downward bias in these estimates results from omitting the liability variable; and increases in employers' costs of workers' compensation are offset dollar-for-dollar by reduced wages. For union workers, however, the evidence on compensating differentials is mixed, and there is no suggestion of a trade-off between wages and the costs of workers' compensation.


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