One does not speak of the rights of American trade unions glibly or in off-hand fashion. Unlike the English policy of defining the rights of labor by legislative enactment, our legislatures, both federal and state, have been particularly slow to make such definition. Such predicability as the labor law has thus far assumed has been largely the work of the courts. Here, in other words, we discover the rights of trade unions in the opinions of the courts; in England, we have been accustomed to look to the statute-book rather than to judicial opinions. Comparatively, English labor law has at least enjoyed the merit of being reasonably predicable. The acts of 1859, 1871, 1875, 1906, and 1913 were all designed either to make the existing law more definite or to overturn a judicial interpretation of the law adverse to labor. Thus, by the year 1927 the law was rather definite. The statutes contained statements of what labor could or could not do. A reading of the recent Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of July 29, 1927, raises the question whether this legislation marks a change in the English policy of fixing the rights of labor by legislative definition.The immediate occasion for the recent act was the general strike of May, 1926. Introduced and rushed through Parliament by the present Conservative government, this measure failed to receive the preliminary study and consideration that preceded the introduction of the acts of 1871 and 1906.
Learning to live with the law? The legislative attack on British trade unions since 1979