Physics and Metaphysics of Music, and Essays on the Philosophy of Mathematics. Lazare Saminsky

This book presents a new approach to the epistemology of mathematics by viewing mathematics as a human activity whose knowledge is intimately linked with practice. Charting an exciting new direction in the philosophy of mathematics, the book uses the crucial idea of a continuum to provide an account of the development of mathematical knowledge that reflects the actual experience of doing math and makes sense of the perceived objectivity of mathematical results. Describing a historically oriented, agent-based philosophy of mathematics, the book shows how the mathematical tradition evolved from Euclidean geometry to the real numbers and set-theoretic structures. It argues for the need to take into account a whole web of mathematical and other practices that are learned and linked by agents, and whose interplay acts as a constraint. It demonstrates how advanced mathematics, far from being a priori, is based on hypotheses, in contrast to elementary math, which has strong cognitive and practical roots and therefore enjoys certainty. Offering a wealth of philosophical and historical insights, the book challenges us to rethink some of our most basic assumptions about mathematics, its objectivity, and its relationship to culture and science.

Univalence and the Concept of Structure in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Siberian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-1-20-32 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 20-32

Author(s):

L. D. Lamberov ◽

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics

Philosophy of Mathematics

10.2307/j.ctt216687n ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Øystein Linnebo

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics

A Second Pilgrim’s Progress

10.1093/oso/9780198803478.003.0009 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark Wilson

Keyword(s):

Set Theory ◽

Applied Mathematics ◽

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Pilgrim's Progress ◽

Open Questions

Influenced by Quine, self-styled naturalist projects within the philosophy of mathematics rest upon simplistic conceptions of linguistic reference and how the inferential tools of applied mathematics help us reach empirical conclusions. In truth, these two forms of descriptive enterprise must work together in a considerably more entangled manner than is generally presumed. In particular, the vital contributions of set theory to descriptive success within science have been poorly conceptualized. This essay explores how a less onerous “naturalism” can be conceived on this corrected basis. A useful distinction between “mathematical optimism” and “mathematical opportunism” is introduced, which draws our attention to some open questions with respect to the concrete representational capacities of applied mathematics.

A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0002 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Lisa Shabel

Keyword(s):

Early Modern ◽

Mathematical Reasoning ◽

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Mathematical Practice ◽

Natural World ◽

Pure Mathematics ◽

Philosophical Account ◽

Mathematical Ontology ◽

To Come ◽

Modern Mathematics

The state of modern mathematical practice called for a modern philosopher of mathematics to answer two interrelated questions. Given that mathematical ontology includes quantifiable empirical objects, how to explain the paradigmatic features of pure mathematical reasoning: universality, certainty, necessity. And, without giving up the special status of pure mathematical reasoning, how to explain the ability of pure mathematics to come into contact with and describe the empirically accessible natural world. The first question comes to a demand for apriority: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the apriority of mathematical reasoning. The second question comes to a demand for applicability: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the applicability of mathematical reasoning. This article begins by providing a brief account of a relevant aspect of early modern mathematical practice, in order to situate philosophers in their historical and mathematical context.

Nominalism

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0015 ◽

2009 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Charles Chihara

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Contemporary Philosophy

Undoubtedly, the most enlightening published work dedicated to giving knowledgeable readers an overview of the topic of nominalism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics is A Subject with No Object by John Burgess and Gideon Rosen. This article begins with a brief description of that work, in order to provide readers with a solidly researched account of nominalism with which the article's own account of nominalism can be usefully compared. The first part, then, briefly presents the Burgess–Rosen account. A contrasting account is given in the longer second part.

Modal Structuralism with Theoretical Terms

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-021-00378-w ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Holger Andreas ◽

Georg Schiemer

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Formal Semantics ◽

Peano Arithmetic ◽

Theoretical Terms ◽

Structural Interpretation ◽

Oxford University ◽

Structuralist Approach ◽

Modal Semantics ◽

Oxford University Press

AbstractIn this paper, we aim to explore connections between a Carnapian semantics of theoretical terms and an eliminative structuralist approach in the philosophy of mathematics. Specifically, we will interpret the language of Peano arithmetic by applying the modal semantics of theoretical terms introduced in Andreas (Synthese 174(3):367–383, 2010). We will thereby show that the application to Peano arithmetic yields a formal semantics of universal structuralism, i.e., the view that ordinary mathematical statements in arithmetic express general claims about all admissible interpretations of the Peano axioms. Moreover, we compare this application with the modal structuralism by Hellman (Mathematics without numbers: towards a modal-structural interpretation. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), arguing that it provides us with an easier epistemology of statements in arithmetic.

Formalism and Hilbert’s understanding of consistency problems

Archive for Mathematical Logic ◽

10.1007/s00153-021-00782-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Detlefsen

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Model Construction ◽

Traditional Model ◽

Consistency Proof ◽

Salient Points ◽

Consistency Problem ◽

Late Nineteenth ◽

Similarity And Difference ◽

Traditional Understanding

AbstractFormalism in the philosophy of mathematics has taken a variety of forms and has been advocated for widely divergent reasons. In Sects. 1 and 2, I briefly introduce the major formalist doctrines of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These are what I call empirico-semantic formalism (advocated by Heine), game formalism (advocated by Thomae) and instrumental formalism (advocated by Hilbert). After describing these views, I note some basic points of similarity and difference between them. In the remainder of the paper, I turn my attention to Hilbert’s instrumental formalism. My primary aim there will be to develop its formalist elements more fully. These are, in the main, (i) its rejection of the axiom-centric focus of traditional model-construction approaches to consistency problems, (ii) its departure from the traditional understanding of the basic nature of proof and (iii) its distinctively descriptive or observational orientation with regard to the consistency problem for arithmetic. More specifically, I will highlight what I see as the salient points of connection between Hilbert’s formalist attitude and his finitist standard for the consistency proof for arithmetic. I will also note what I see as a significant tension between Hilbert’s observational approach to the consistency problem for arithmetic and his expressed hope that his solution of that problem would dispense with certain epistemological concerns regarding arithmetic once and for all.

The Legacy of Mario Pieri in Foundations and Philosophy of Mathematics

10.1007/978-0-8176-4823-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Elena Anne Corie Marchisotto ◽

Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra ◽

James T. Smith

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics

Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics

10.1017/9781108687126 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Juliet Floyd

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics