Identity Politics Past and Present

This new book in Critical Discourse Studies uses detailed and systematic analysis of the discursive construction of Austrian identities across a period of 20 years – from 1995 to 2015 – to trace the re-emergence of nationalism in the media, popular culture and politics, and the normalization of far-right nativist ideologies and attitudes. Contradictory and intertwined tendencies towards re-nationalization and trans-nationalization have always framed debates about European identities, but during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the debates became polarized. During the COVID-19 pandemic, nation states first reacted by closing borders, while symbols of banal nationalism proliferated. The data, drawn from a variety of empirical studies, suggests changes in memory politics – the way past events are remembered – are due to a range of factors, including the growth of migrant societies; the influence of financial and climate crises; changing gender politics; and a new transnational European politics of the past. The authors assess the challenges to liberal democracies and fundamental human and constitutional rights, and analyze how the pandemic contributes to a new re-nationalization across Europe and beyond.

What Is the “Public Good” in a Pandemic? Who Decides?

Governments in liberal democracies, such as the U.S. and in Europe, derive their authority from the consent of the people and exist for the “public good.” This chapter explores the proper role of government in communicating information and in enacting public health measures to prevent the spread of infection during a pandemic. This chapter includes historical context and exemplars of government policy makers' dissemination of COVID-19 health information, both accurate and inaccurate ones. Government officials have a responsibility to promote and support public policy initiatives that balance public safety with individual rights and self-determination. In some cases, citizens did not trust the government initiatives nor the associated misinformation or lockdowns. People reacted by exercising their right to protest. This chapter highlights government actions that were not based on accurate information and contributed to its spread and an increase of cyberchondria across the population, demonstrating the public good may not have been well served.

Nationalism is dead, long live nationalism! In pursuit of pluralistic nationalism: A critical overview

Rather than vilifying or rejecting it, an increasing number of scholars from two seemingly anti-nationalist cohorts, namely liberal political theory and multiculturalism, have come to argue that nationalism is not intrinsically illiberal or undesirable, but some forms of it (e.g. liberal, multicultural, pluralistic) can be a positive force to meet the demands for nation-building, national identity and national culture, on the one hand, and demands for recognition, respect and accommodation of diversity, on the other. This paper critically examines recent scholarly literature on liberal nationalism and multicultural nationalism. It argues that both projects have developed necessary responses to (1) growing diversity and (2) ethnonational and populist-majoritarian forms of nationalism and hence, are welcome. However, two substantial shortcomings need to be addressed. The first is the nation-building–education nexus and the limits of multicultural education (e.g. the teaching of history), and the second is the nationalism–transnationalism nexus or the normative desirability of dual nationalities. The paper concludes that a morally acceptable form of nationalism (e.g. pluralistic, inclusive or moderate) operating within multi-national and multicultural liberal democracies is theoretically possible, yet its viability is related to the extent to which it addresses the two issues raised, amongst others.

Modern solidarity and administrative repression

Modern society is based on the predominance of organic solidarity over mechanical solidarity and, consequently, on the predominance of the law, which ensures cooperation between autonomous subjects from repressive law, which sanctions, through penalty, any deviation from the standards of the common conscience. Modern society is “civilized”, i.e. it is firstly and foremost based on “civil” law, the repressive law only being exceptional, which translates into three principles: that of the subsidiarity of criminal law, that of the necessity and legality of offences and penalties, and that of the additional protection of individual freedom when the subject is criminally charged. The consequence thereof is that, in modern liberal democracies, all repressive law is criminal, that any charge which may lead to the application of a repressive sanction is a criminal charge and that the law-maker cannot assign to the administration the competence regarding the application of repressive sanctions. Under these circumstances, the transformation of some repressive norms into norms of administrative law is a violation of the fundamental principles that structure the legal order of modern liberal states. Nonetheless, this type of practice is becoming more common. In order to ensure individual freedom, this tendency must be corrected. As politicians are not willing to do so, naturally this is a task for the judicial courts, that can rely for this endeavour on the European Court of Human Rights’ constructive jurisprudence.

Social Justice

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.

Torture and the Norm against It

Why has torture persisted into the twenty-first century despite long-standing normative and legal prohibitions? Especially strange is torture’s occurrence at the hands of liberal democracies, which are supposed to uphold human rights. Perhaps we should not be surprised by democratic hypocrisy in war—realists and rational choice theorists expect all states to violate norms if doing so holds instrumental promise. Yet torture is likely to yield inaccurate intelligence, harm valuable detainees’ memories, stress interrogators, invite retaliation, and encourage the enemy to fight on rather than surrender. In short, torture is both ethically and efficaciously questionable—and its recurrence is puzzling.

Liberal-Democratic Torture

This chapter gives a primer on liberal-democratic torture. A brief summary of the historical record shows that liberal democracies have repeatedly engaged in “stealth” coercive interrogation, which the chapter argues usually qualifies as torture by the UN Convention against Torture’s standard definition. What can explain the pattern of recurrence that emerges? Previous work is a useful starting point but leaves important questions unanswered. Lack of monitoring can invite norm violations, but torture is not always hidden. Racism and anger make states and individuals more likely to torture, but they do not tell us why torture often occurs in conjunction with demands for intelligence. Realist and rational choice arguments help to explain the frequent connection between torture and intelligence needs, but they fail to address critical lurking puzzles: Why do people believe torture works? And how do torturers justify these norm-breaking deeds to themselves and others?

Digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion: Applying deliberative theories of democracy to political parties

Today’s election campaigns are heavily data-driven. Despite the numerous skeptical voices questioning the compatibility of specific campaigning practices with fundamental principles of liberal democracies, there has to date been little comprehensive work in this area from the perspective of normative democratic theory. Our article addresses this gap by drawing on recent research on the normative theory of political parties in the field of deliberative democratic theory. The deliberative theories of democracy proposed by Habermas and Rawls contain structural elements of a normative theory of the political party: the special status of political parties as mediators between background culture and the political forum, between the political system and the public sphere, and between the individual and the state, confers on them a central position as actors in in the public use of reason and deliberation.We argue in this article for a view of digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion and for the proposition that, alongside other actors, political parties have a special responsibility in this regard. We point to the implications for the evaluation and design of digital political microtargeting that arise from the application of deliberative principles to political parties and consider the need they reveal for the ongoing development of detailed, nuanced normative theories of democracy.

The Politics of Social Cohesion

In contemporary liberal democracies, it is difficult to find a policy issue as divisive as immigration. A common worry is that immigration poses a threat to social cohesion, and so to the social unity that underpins cooperation, stable democratic institutions, and a robust welfare state. At the heart of this worry is the suggestion that social cohesion requires a shared identity at the societal level. The Politics of Social Cohesion considers in greater detail the impact of immigration on social cohesion and egalitarian redistribution. First, it critically scrutinizes an influential argument, according to which immigration leads to ethnic diversity, which again tends to undermine trust and solidarity and so the social basis for redistribution. According to this argument, immigration should be severely restricted. Second, it considers the suggestion that, in response to worries about immigration, states should promote a shared identity to foster social cohesion in the citizenry. It is argued that the effects of immigration on social cohesion do not need to compromise social justice and that core principles of liberty and equality not only form the normative basis for just policies of immigration and integration, as a matter of empirical fact, they are also the values that, if shared, are most likely to produce the social cohesion among community members providing the social basis for implementing justice. This argument draws heavily on both normative political philosophy and empirical social science. The normative framework defended is cosmopolitan, liberal egalitarian, and to some extent multicultural.