Intergroup Competition in Exergames: Further Tests of the Köhler Effect

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 240-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tayo Moss ◽  
Deborah L. Feltz ◽  
Norbert L. Kerr ◽  
Alan L. Smith ◽  
Brian Winn ◽  
...  
2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert L. Kerr ◽  
Lawrence A. Messe ◽  
Ernest S. Park ◽  
Dong-Heon Seok ◽  
Eric Sambolec
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie L. Kuchynka ◽  
Jennifer K. Bosson ◽  
Joseph A. Vandello ◽  
Curtis Puryear

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 422-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Bornstein ◽  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
Lucia Kerpel ◽  
Tani Katz

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Ochieng' Opalo ◽  
Leonardo R. Arriola ◽  
Donghyun Danny Choi ◽  
Matthew Gichohi

In order to comply with electoral rules incentivizing cross-ethnic mobilization, candidates in divided societies often campaign in opponents’ strongholds among non-coethnics. In this paper, we show that such cross-ethnic campaign rallies may actually depress outgroup candidates’ support among non-coethnics. We argue that candidates’ holding of campaign rallies in non-coethnic constituencies can inadvertently trigger perceptions of intergroup competition, increase the salience of ethnicity, and depress support for non-coethnic candidates. We leverage a natural experiment that exploits the timing of an unscheduled campaign rally held by a presidential candidate in a non-coethnic county in his opponent’s stronghold during Kenya’s 2017 election. In comparing survey respondents before and after the rally, we find that the candidate’s post-rally favorability significantly decreased among non-coethnic voters, while the proportion of voters identifying in ethnic terms simultaneously increased. These findings have important implications for the efficacy of institutional design to promote cross-ethnic political mobilization in polarized societies.


2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 685-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Halevy ◽  
Eileen Y. Chou ◽  
Taya R. Cohen ◽  
Gary Bornstein

Two experiments utilized a new experimental paradigm—the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma— Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game—to study how relative deprivation at the group level affects intergroup competition. The IPD-MD game enables group members to make a costly contribution to either a within-group pool that benefits fellow ingroup members, or a between-group pool, which, in addition, harms outgroup members. We found that when group members were put in a disadvantaged position, either by previous actions of the outgroup (Experiment 1) or by random misfortune (Experiment 2), they contributed substantially more to the competitive between-group pool. This destructive behavior both minimized inequality between the groups and reduced collective efficiency. Our results underscore the conditions that lead group members to care about relative (rather than absolute) group outcomes and highlight the need to differentiate between the motivation to get ahead and the motivation not to fall behind: the latter, it appears, is what motivates individual participation in destructive intergroup competition.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Daniel Hartlep ◽  
Robert Jay Lowinger

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