Party Fragmentation, the Proportional System and Democracy in Slovenia

In Slovenia, political parties have been the key actors in opting for a proportional electoral system and constitutional choice of a parliamentary system, both of which are believed to help to develop a consensual type of democracy. However, a vicious circle involving a fragmented party system and a proportional electoral system has not only led to polarisation within the party system, but has also contributed to problems of democratic governability and legitimacy. The destabilisation of the party system since 2011 has not only caused a crisis of political legitimacy and accountability, but has also contributed to a recent trend of de-democratisation. At the moment, there does not appear to be a realistic alternative to the existing electoral rules in the near future, in spite of recurring calls by an anti-communist party (Slovenian Democratic Party) to introduce a majoritarian system.

Introducing COMEPELDA: Comprehensive European Parliament electoral data covering rules, parties and candidates

We introduce a new collection of data that consolidates information on European Parliament elections into one comprehensive source. It provides information on formal electoral rules as well as national-level and district-level election results for parties and individual politicians (including full candidate lists). The use of existing and new key variables makes it easy to link the data across the different units of observation (country, party, candidate, member of parliament) and join them with external information. Currently, the data cover four elections (1999–2014). Among other aspects, the collection should facilitate research on the European Parliament's allegedly weak electoral connection. In this article, we outline the main features of the datasets, describe patterns of intra-party competition and preference voting and conduct exploratory analyses of individual-level changes in list positions.

Rethinking Electoral Reform Processes after the Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System

<p>The 2012 Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP system recommended that several changes be made to the way in which future parliaments are elected in New Zealand. The lack of legislative response to the recommendations highlighted an issue inherent in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements - that changes to electoral rules are designed and enacted by politicians, and there is no mechanism through which citizens can initiate or meaningfully engage with electoral reform processes. This paper looks at whether there is a better way that such proposals for electoral rule changes could be managed, proposing the use of ‘citizen initiated’ Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform.</p>

Rethinking Electoral Reform Processes after the Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System

<p>The 2012 Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP system recommended that several changes be made to the way in which future parliaments are elected in New Zealand. The lack of legislative response to the recommendations highlighted an issue inherent in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements - that changes to electoral rules are designed and enacted by politicians, and there is no mechanism through which citizens can initiate or meaningfully engage with electoral reform processes. This paper looks at whether there is a better way that such proposals for electoral rule changes could be managed, proposing the use of ‘citizen initiated’ Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform.</p>

Consensus Gained, Consensus Maintained? Changing New Zealand's Electoral Law 1927-2007

<p>In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand's first unified Electoral Act in 1927, and the passage of the Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New Zealand Parliament passed 66 acts that altered or amended New Zealand's electoral law. One central assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only change electoral rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest.1 This thesis is an investigation into the way New Zealand governments effect and have effected their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative process, and the roles self-interest and the active search for consensus between political parties have played in that process. It argues that, while self-interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of parliamentary processes influenced behaviour to an equal, and perhaps even greater, extent.</p>

Consensus Gained, Consensus Maintained? Changing New Zealand's Electoral Law 1927-2007

<p>In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand's first unified Electoral Act in 1927, and the passage of the Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New Zealand Parliament passed 66 acts that altered or amended New Zealand's electoral law. One central assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only change electoral rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest.1 This thesis is an investigation into the way New Zealand governments effect and have effected their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative process, and the roles self-interest and the active search for consensus between political parties have played in that process. It argues that, while self-interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of parliamentary processes influenced behaviour to an equal, and perhaps even greater, extent.</p>

Institutions, Climate Change, and the Foundations of Long-term Policymaking

Many policy problems require taking costly action today for future benefits. Examining the case of climate change, this paper examines how two institutions, electoral rules and interest group intermediation, structure distributional politics, and as a result drive variation in climate “policy investments” across the high-income democracies. Proportional electoral rules increase electoral safety, allowing politicians to impose short-term costs on voters. Concertation between industry and the state enables governments to compensate losers, defusing organized opposition to policy change. Moreover, the joint presence of both institutions generates complementarities that reinforce their independent effects, pushing countries onto different climate politics trajectories. Newly available data on climate policy stringency provides support for the arguments. Countries with PR and interest group concertation have the highest levels of policy stringency and distribute higher costs toward consumers. The analysis points to causal mechanisms that should structure responses to a more general set of long-term challenges.