Executive Pay and Risk-taking in the European Banking Industry

2013 ◽  
pp. 159-189
Author(s):  
Jens Hagendorff
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
European Banking

Book Reviews

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 861-862
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Associate Professor ◽  
International Institute ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
European Bank ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
The University

Examines size, risk, and governance in European banking. Discusses bank systemic size and systemic crises; increasing in size and bank default risk—evidence from European bank mergers; the trends and composition of banking risk across Europe; the determinants of European bank exposure to systemic shocks; board monitoring, regulation, and performance in the European banking industry; executive pay and risk-taking in the European banking industry; systemic risk potential and opacity in European banks; and implications for the reregulation of European banking. Hagendorff is Martin Currie Professor in Finance and Investment at the University of Edinburgh. Keasey is Professor of Financial Services, Director of the International Institute of Banking and Financial Services, and Head of the Accounting and Finance Department at the University of Leeds. Vallascas is Associate Professor of Banking and Finance at the University of Leeds.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina E. Bannier ◽  
Eberhard Feess ◽  
Natalie Packham
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking Industry
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