Cognitive Neuroscience, Moral Responsibility, and Punishment

Author(s):  
Nancey Murphy
2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liad Mudrik ◽  
Uri Maoz

Our intuitive concept of the relations between brain and mind is increasingly challenged by the scientific world view. Yet, although few neuroscientists openly endorse Cartesian dualism, careful reading reveals dualistic intuitions in prominent neuroscientific texts. Here, we present the “double-subject fallacy”: treating the brain and the entire person as two independent subjects who can simultaneously occupy divergent psychological states and even have complex interactions with each other—as in “my brain knew before I did.” Although at first, such writing may appear like harmless, or even cute, shorthand, a closer look suggests that it can be seriously misleading. Surprisingly, this confused writing appears in various cognitive-neuroscience texts, from prominent peer-reviewed articles to books intended for lay audience. Far from being merely metaphorical or figurative, this type of writing demonstrates that dualistic intuitions are still deeply rooted in contemporary thought, affecting even the most rigorous practitioners of the neuroscientific method. We discuss the origins of such writing and its effects on the scientific arena as well as demonstrate its relevance to the debate on legal and moral responsibility.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Mottron

Abstract Stepping away from a normocentric understanding of autism goes beyond questioning the supposed lack of social motivation of autistic people. It evokes subversion of the prevalence of intellectual disability even in non-verbal autism. It also challenges the perceived purposelessness of some restricted interests and repetitive behaviors, and instead interprets them as legitimate exploratory and learning-associated manifestations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gian Domenico Iannetti ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara

Abstract Some of the foundations of Heyes’ radical reasoning seem to be based on a fractional selection of available evidence. Using an ethological perspective, we argue against Heyes’ rapid dismissal of innate cognitive instincts. Heyes’ use of fMRI studies of literacy to claim that culture assembles pieces of mental technology seems an example of incorrect reverse inferences and overlap theories pervasive in cognitive neuroscience.


1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (8) ◽  
pp. 642-643
Author(s):  
Howard C. Hughes

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Weldon

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