The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice in the Light of Recent Developments

Author(s):  
Mohamed Bennouna
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-89
Author(s):  
María Querol

Although boundaries, including freshwater ones, are generally set by treaties concluded by the states concerned, interpretation of such agreements by the different states has varied, resulting in a number of disputes before international tribunals. The aim of this monograph is to describe and analyze the different methods applied in the delimitation of international rivers and lakes and the recent developments in this field. The monograph reassesses these diverse methods of boundary delimitation in view of the latest and abundant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the tribunals under the aegis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the subject. The monograph also focuses on the influence of human considerations in the field under study and the legal consequences ensuing therefrom, in addition to drawing some conclusions regarding freshwater boundaries.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Howse ◽  
Ruti Teitel

Abstract One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
FT Abioye

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter establishes the doctrine of the prohibition of the use of force amongst member states of the UN. Article 51 lays down exceptions to this rule in terms of the fact that there can be an individual and/or collective use of force in self-defence in the case of an armed attack. This individual or collective use of force is permitted to continue until such a time as the Security Council takes such actions as are necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has further confirmed this prohibition of the use of force in the Nicaragua case, Congo v Uganda and Oil Platforms cases. This area ofinternational law has seen a lot of discussions and developments over the years. The purpose of this article is to examine the efficacy of the use of force between Russia and Georgia; and Israel and Gaza in 2008. It would be examined if these armed attacks are justifiable by the doctrine of self-defence and the recent developments in the field in international law, or if they in fact constitute a breach of the international law prohibition on the use of force. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-493
Author(s):  
Charles N. Brower ◽  
Massimo Lando

AbstractJudges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice have been widely criticized for their supposed lack of impartiality. This criticism may seem all the more powerful if one takes into account that judges ad hoc were created as a means to avoid the Court’s bias and appearance of bias. However, recent developments in the appointment of judges ad hoc indicate that, far from being a detriment to the states’ perception of the Court’s impartiality, judges ad hoc are a means to enhance the perception that the Court as a whole is impartial. Such developments include the increased frequency with which former elected judges are appointed judges ad hoc, the practice of electing judges from the ranks of former (or sitting) judges ad hoc, and the appointment of nationals or non-nationals as judges ad hoc. The institution of judges ad hoc has come full circle, and should be regarded as fulfilling the function for which it was created.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-218
Author(s):  
Ksenia Polonskaya

Abstract This article examines the notion of consent as an element of judicial propriety as defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of its advisory function. The article situates the issue of judicial propriety within a broader conversation on the Court’s normative outlooks in international law, and examines the most recent advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago to understand how the Court itself views its role in international law. The article concludes that the Court’s advisory opinions do not provide much clarity as to the circumstances in which a lack of consent will become a compelling enough reason to justify a refusal to give an advisory opinion. The Court appears to ritually recite consent as a relevant element in its assessment of judicial propriety, however, it continues to limit such relevance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document