SOME CLARITY ON THE ACCRUAL OF LIVING ANNUITIES AT DEATH OR DIVORCE CM v EM (1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)

A conventional life annuity is a contract in terms whereof an annuity underwriter guarantees a periodical payment to an insured in exchange for an initial non-refundable premium. The insurer pools all the annuity premiums together and assumes both the investment performance and the mortality risk by way of actuarial comparisons. The annuitant’s income is guaranteed for life or for a minimum period.Living annuities on the other hand are regulated by the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and are market-linked investments (with no income guarantee) in respect of which the annuitant annually chooses the drawdown rate – currently between 2.5 and 17.5 per cent per annum (compare Regulations in terms of s 36 of the Pensions Act 24 of 1956 and s 106(1)(a) read with s 108(1) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017.) When an annuitant dies, the death benefit is payable to a nominated beneficiary or the estate of the insured. A pension-interest benefit is an asset for the purposes of the division of an estate at divorce, and includes both pension and provident funds. Living annuities, however, do not fall within the definition of “pension interest” as defined in s 1 of the Divorce Act.In CM v EM ((1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)), the Supreme Court of Appeal, in an appeal from the full court of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, sitting as court of appeal, had the opportunity to determine where the ownership of capital invested in the form of a living annuity vests, as well as whether the value of an annuitant spouse’s right to future annuity payments is an asset in his or her estate and therefore subject to accrual. Accrual in respect of an estate is the amount by which the net value of the estate at the dissolution of a marriage exceeds the net value of that estate at the commencement of the marriage. At the dissolution of a marriage owing to death and subject to the accrual system, the spouse whose estate shows no accrual, or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, has a claim against the other spouse or his or her deceased estate.It is submitted that some implications of the accrual dispensation, particularly within the context of certain pension and financial products, are still in their discovery phase, nearly 40 years after their introduction. In the absence of any reference to a living annuity in an antenuptial contract, the question was always whether such an investment is subject to the accrual system at divorce or death. In the context of a life assurance policy, the surrender value of the policy was taken into account in the event of divorce, but in the event of death, the question was whether, for accrual purposes, the factor taken into account should be the surrender value or the policy proceeds. As only assets that form part of the estate of a spouse can be considered for accrual purposes, the very nature of a living annuity had to be investigated in the matter of CM v EM (supra). This case was an application for special leave to appeal from the full court in the matter of Emilio Pietro Valfredo Montanari v Charmaine Helen Montanari (Montanari v Montanari).

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ISLAMIC AND SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ON LIVING AND CADAVERIC ORGAN DONATIONS: CONSENSUS AND DIVERGENCE

Religion plays a pivotal role in people’s attitude to organ donation. Generally, practising Muslims (adherents of the Islamic faith) are unlikely to consent to organ donation because they believe it is not in keeping with the tenets of Islamic law (Sharī`ah). Although there is a wealth of information on organ donation with reference to both South African and Islamic law, there has not been a study comparing the two sets of laws. The purpose of this article is to develop the literature on living and cadaveric organ donation by drawing a comparison between Islamic law and South African law on this issue. Apart from a few minor differences inherent in each set of laws, there is a startling consensus in South African law and Sunnī (mainstream) Islamic law on the issue of organ donation. This research is also significant in that it provides legal and medical professionals, academics and practitioners with an informed position from which to advise clients and/or patients. This may in turn raise awareness among clients and/or patients, which could result in a desirable increase in organ donation rates among Muslims in South Africa. This article makes a number of recommendations in this regard.

SELECTED CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE RETROACTIVE TRANSFER PRICING ADJUSTMENTS OF IMPORTED GOODS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The article analyses selected challenges associated with retroactive transfer pricing adjustments of imported goods under the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (Customs and Excise Act). This is done in order to examine the regulatory challenges affecting retroactive transfer pricing adjustments and customs valuation processes of imported goods under the Customs and Excise Act. Thus, the enforcement of retroactive transfer pricing adjustments of imported goods for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) is scrutinised in terms of the Customs and Excise Act. To this end, the article provides an overview analysis of selected regulatory and related challenges affecting retroactive transfer pricing adjustments and actual valuation processes of imported goods within different MNEs in South Africa. Accordingly, the article explores selected challenges in order to recommend possible remedies and measures that could be employed by policy makers to enhance the regulatory and enforcement framework under the Customs and Excise Act.

PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA: PROHIBITION OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE

On 18 September 2019, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate chastisement” is unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violates sections 10 and 12(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. As a result, parents are no longer permitted to punish their child at home by way of inflicting physical punishment behind a facade of discipline. Despite the aforesaid, it should be noted that corporal punishment in the private sphere is not explicitly prohibited by South African legislation. In addition, South Africa’s legislative system lacks an appropriate regulatory framework to administer the anticipated proliferation of assault cases against parents. It is against this backdrop that this article first analyses the current legislative framework regulating the protection of children from physical punishment, and then follows with a succinct overview of the Constitutional Court ruling. The article assesses whether the mere repeal of the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate” chastisement will be sufficient to eradicate corporal punishment in the private sphere, and if not, whether legislative prohibition and/or other interceding strategies will be required to give effect to the objective of the Constitutional Court ruling. In this regard, by way of comparative research, the legislative framework adopted by Sweden, being the first country in the world to prohibit all forms of corporate punishment of children is evaluated. Lastly, recommendations are made for the incorporation of practical steps, including possible legislative measures, to establish a regulatory framework from a children’s rights perspective to prohibit corporal punishment in the private sphere. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis and consideration, a qualitative approach is applied for purposes of the research. Primary sources such as the Constitution, case law, legislation, governmental documents, statistical data and research reports are consulted in conjunction with journal articles and textbooks.

BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE ‒ THE ACTIO DE PAUPERIE REVISITED Van Meyeren v Cloete (636/2019) [2020] ZASCA 100 (11 September 2020)

It is trite that the South African law of delict follows a generalising approach. This entails that liability will only ensue when all the elements of delict are present. South African law does not recognise individual “delicts”. The generalising approach followed in South African law is qualified in that there are three main delictual actions, namely the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss; the actio inuriarum for loss arising from intentional infringements of personality rights; and the Germanic action for pain and suffering, in terms of which a plaintiff can claim compensation for negligent infringements of the physical-mental integrity. This approach is further qualified in that numerous actions dating back to Roman law still exist in our law today. Included in this mix are the actions for harm caused by animals, such as the actio de pauperie, the actio de pastu, and the actio de feris, each with its own requirements. There have been questions as to whether these actions, in particular the actio de pauperie, still form part of South African law. In Loriza Brahman v Dippenaar (2002 (2) SA 477 (SCA) 487) the defendant claimed that the actio was no longer part of the South African law. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) per Olivier JA held that the actio de pauperie had been part of South African law for more than 24 centuries and not fallen into disuse. Olivier JA held that the fact that the action is based on strict liability (one of the arguments raised against it) is no reason to ban it from South African law as strict liability was increasing and in suitable instances fulfils a useful function.The SCA, again, recently confirmed the continued existence of the action in South African law in the case of Van Meyeren v Cloete ((636/2019) [2020] ZASCA 100 (11 September 2020) 40). In this case, the SCA had to decide whether to extend the defences against liability in terms of the actio de pauperie to the negligence of a third party that was not in control of the animal. The defendant held that the court should develop the common law in this regard. Considering both case law and the requirements for the development of the common law, the SCA held that such an extension could not be justified.

MISTAKEN IDENTITY OF THE VICTIM IN CRIMINAL LAW

Along with the drama and pathos that the trial of Oscar Pistorius brought to a multitude of South Africans, who devotedly followed the events (and dissections of events) with great dedication a few years ago, the case also highlighted and publicized a number of legal rules and doctrines. Who would have thought, for example, that the term of art dolus eventualis would emerge as the subject of such quizzical interest for so many?Other issues which emerged are no less interesting from a legal perspective, but are admittedly of much more narrow and parochial interest, being limited to those who are required to apply substantive criminal law, whether in the courts or in the classroom. One of these is the error in obiecto notion (the spelling “obiecto”, rather than “objecto” which more typically appears in the textbooks and the case law, is more correct, although, both spelling forms will be used below, as needs be). The word “notion” is carefully selected, since describing error in obiecto as a rule, has been firmly and correctly dismissed as incorrect by Snyman (Hoctor Snyman’s Criminal Law 7ed (2020) 171): “[It] is not the description of a legal rule; it merely describes a certain type of factual situation.” Burchell’s point of departure is even more stark: “[T]he so-called error in objecto rule has uncertain, dubious origins and reference to it, even as a description of a factual predicament, should be excluded from the lawyers’ lexicon”. Phelps uses the phrase “little-known principle” to describe this “factual predicament”. The author in Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers, Leslie and Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa 3ed (2018) 263 does not use any nomenclature when discussing the legal position arising out of this factual situation.

THE RULE OF LAW IN INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VERSUS THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: SOME OBSERVATIONS

The rule of law is expressly mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The principle of legality has flourished in South African administrative law since its recognition and reception into our law in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). The Indian Constitution does not contain an equivalent expression of the rule of law. Notably, how persons and societies in India govern themselves is premised upon beliefs akin to the rule of law. Moreover, Indian administrative law has been strongly influenced by the theory of the rule of law as advocated by Dicey. Whilst Indian administrative law relies heavily upon the rule of law to judicially review conduct that is capricious, South African administrative law has come to rely on the incident of the rule of law, namely the principle of legality. This contribution inspects some of the reasons why the rule of law is heavily relied on in Indian administrative law – where it essentially mirrors the South African administrative law principle of legality. This contribution also suggests reasons as to why the principle of legality is so prevalent in South African administrative law as opposed to merely the rule of law as employed by the Indian courts in Indian administrative law.

PREDATORY PRICING: SINGLE- FIRM DOMINANCE, EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE AND PREDATORY PRICES (PART 3)

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018. In light of these developments, this three-part series of articles evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the crucial elements of dominance and abuse are also discussed. The first in this series of three articles critically evaluated the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. The second article discussed the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary conduct, the criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. This article focuses on the law of predatory prices under section 8(1)(c) and 8(1)(d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, when interpreting or applying the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and which gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof and where appropriate, the South African position is mainly compared with the position in the European Union and the United States.

DISMISSAL ARISING FROM FLOUTING COVID-19 HEALTH AND SAFETY PROTOCOLS Eskort Limited v Stuurman Mogotsi [2021] ZALCJHB 53

The Labour Court judgment handed down by Tlhotlhalemaje J in Eskort Limited v Stuurman Mogotsi (JR1644/20) (2021) ZALCJHB 53 (Eskort Limited) on 28 March 2021 raised the topical issue of fairness regarding the dismissal of an employee for gross misconduct and negligence related to his failure to follow and/or observe COVID-19-related health and safety protocols put in place at the workplace (Eskort Limited supra par 1).In light of the above, the objectives of this case note are twofold. First, it examines the parameters under which the employer can discipline an employee for flouting the COVID-19 safety protocols and regulations. Secondly, it also considers the extent to which the employer can take appropriate action against an employee who wilfully refuses to obey the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer during COVID-19 times.

THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION: UNRESOLVED ISSUES REMAIN

Despite the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) being generally viewed as one of the major successes of United Nations treaty-making, unresolved issues remain. These range from maritime boundary disputes to straight baselines to artificial islands to military activities in the exclusive economic zone to environmental issues. Four decades have altered the fundamental nature of the regime relating to the law of the sea and have created major implementational challenges. The oceans are becoming more crowded by competitive human activities and, as technology progresses and geopolitical shifts occur, it has become imperative that the unresolved issues be resolved. In so doing UNCLOS’s initial vision can be augmented. This article focuses on five of the more problematic unresolved issues.