Judges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-493
Author(s):  
Charles N. Brower ◽  
Massimo Lando

AbstractJudges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice have been widely criticized for their supposed lack of impartiality. This criticism may seem all the more powerful if one takes into account that judges ad hoc were created as a means to avoid the Court’s bias and appearance of bias. However, recent developments in the appointment of judges ad hoc indicate that, far from being a detriment to the states’ perception of the Court’s impartiality, judges ad hoc are a means to enhance the perception that the Court as a whole is impartial. Such developments include the increased frequency with which former elected judges are appointed judges ad hoc, the practice of electing judges from the ranks of former (or sitting) judges ad hoc, and the appointment of nationals or non-nationals as judges ad hoc. The institution of judges ad hoc has come full circle, and should be regarded as fulfilling the function for which it was created.

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
James N. Hyde

Litigation of contentious cases before the International Court of Justice has in some instances been a lengthy and comparatively expensive procedure. However, it is not necessarily the Court or its procedure that produces this situation, because governments parties to litigation sometimes feel it is important to retain a number of advocates to plead, and they agree on comparatively long periods for the preparation of written pleadings. Comparing this procedure with ad hoc arbitration before a referee and two arbitrators, the latter looks comparatively swift and inexpensive. However, there are as yet unused possibilities for the International Court to adjudicate cases on a basis comparable in time and expense to ad hoc arbitration. The use of the Court for what might be less important cases would also contribute to its institutional development.


Author(s):  
Amit KUMAR

Abstract The adoption of the Rome Statute is a significant moment for international criminal law. Before its formulation, the criminal law was governed by the sources mentioned in their statute or Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ Statute]. Custom is one of the important sources within the ICJ Statute. The ad hoc tribunals applied custom and even formulated certain customs. The formulation of custom is considered as against the principle of legality. To avoid such criticism, the State Parties inserted Article 21 in the Rome Statute. The provision clarifies the law which the court can apply. The parties chose not to include custom explicitly. However, the wordings of the provision indicate that the custom is still a source for the court. Apart from the wording of Article 21, other provisions of the Statute give ample scope for the application of custom.


Author(s):  
Edward G. Lee ◽  
Edward McWhinney

The Statute of the International Court of Justice specifies that the nominations of candidates for election to the Court shall be made by “national groups” constituted either by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PGA), or by national groups appointed for this purpose “under the same conditions” as those prescribed for members of the PCA under the Hague Convention of 1907. As of May 1987, about half the member states of the United Nations — seventy-six out of one hundred and fifty-eight — were members of the PCA, but among these only sixty-two had functioning national groups. Official United Nations documents show that a great many national groups from other states, perhaps created on an ad hoc basis for the regular elections to the Court, submit nominations as provided under Article 4(2) of the Statute. Once a candidate has been nominated by one or more national groups, the state of which he is a national is free to decide whether formally to sponsor his candidacy and to seek the support of other states in the elections to be held in the General Assembly and the Security Council.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-89
Author(s):  
María Querol

Although boundaries, including freshwater ones, are generally set by treaties concluded by the states concerned, interpretation of such agreements by the different states has varied, resulting in a number of disputes before international tribunals. The aim of this monograph is to describe and analyze the different methods applied in the delimitation of international rivers and lakes and the recent developments in this field. The monograph reassesses these diverse methods of boundary delimitation in view of the latest and abundant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the tribunals under the aegis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the subject. The monograph also focuses on the influence of human considerations in the field under study and the legal consequences ensuing therefrom, in addition to drawing some conclusions regarding freshwater boundaries.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan I. Charney

Judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and awards of ad hoc arbitration tribunals carry special weight in international maritime boundary law. On its face, the international maritime boundary law codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is indeterminate. For the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the legal obligation of coastal states is to delimit the boundary “by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” The article on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the territorial sea is no more determinative despite the fact that it makes direct references to the equidistant line, special circumstances and historic title. In spite of this indeterminacy, if not because of it, coastal states have found that third-party dispute settlement procedures can effectively resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. As a consequence, there are more judgments and awards on maritime boundary disputes than on any other subject of international law, and this trend is continuing.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Howse ◽  
Ruti Teitel

Abstract One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem.


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