Henry Kissinger and US Foreign Relations

Author(s):  
Thomas Alan Schwartz

Henry Kissinger was the most famous and most controversial American diplomat of the second half of the 20th century. Escaping Nazi persecution in the 1930s, serving in the American Army of occupation in Germany after 1945, and then pursuing a successful academic career at Harvard University, Kissinger had already achieved national prominence as a foreign policy analyst and defense intellectual when he was appointed national security adviser by President Richard Nixon in January 1969. Kissinger quickly became the president’s closest adviser on foreign affairs and worked with Nixon to change American foreign policy in response to domestic upheaval caused by the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nixon and Kissinger’s initiatives, primarily détente with the Soviet Union, the opening to the People’s Republic of China, and ending American involvement in the Vietnam War, received strong domestic support and helped to bring about Nixon’s re-election landslide in 1972. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Nixon appointed Kissinger secretary of state in August 1973. As Nixon’s capacity to govern deteriorated, Kissinger assumed all-but presidential powers, even putting American forces on alert during the Yom Kippur war and then engaging in “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East, achieving the first-ever agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria. Kissinger retained a dominating influence over foreign affairs during the presidency of Gerald Ford, even as he became a lightning rod for critics on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Although out of public office after 1977, Kissinger remained in the public eye as a foreign policy commentator, wrote three volumes of memoirs as well as other substantial books on diplomacy, and created a successful international business-consulting firm. His only governmental positions were as chair of the Commission on Central America in 1983–1984 and a brief moment on the 9/11 Commission in 2002.

2021 ◽  
pp. 340-368
Author(s):  
Robert B. Packer

In this chapter, I will review what I see as the essential characteristics of the Obama foreign policy style and analyze whether we can discern a clear “Obama doctrine” from his foreign policy actions and rhetoric. In order to do so, I will lay out the four major approaches to American foreign policy-making and then assess how Obama’s policies fit within these approaches. Obama’s early foreign policy moves emphasized reconciliation and a more focused approach on counterterrorism as opposed to regime change. However, domestic political and international geopolitical constraints came to limit his ambitions. As the first Black president, Obama’s initial soaring rhetoric of change was replaced by cautionary tales of avoiding mistakes. After laying out the four schools of American foreign policy (nationalist, realist, liberal institutionalist, neoconservative), I discuss Obama’s policy style—the “nonideological doctrine”—that was purposively deliberative and cautious, in contrast to the ideological Bush regime-change crusade. Obama was careful to weigh the costs and benefits of policy options, keeping an eye on his predilection that foreign affairs must not interfere with the domestic agenda. This caution, which avoided major commitments to overseas conflicts, came under criticism from both the Left and Right of the political spectrum.


2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
CARLA MENEGUZZI ROSTAGNI

AbstractRelying on evidence from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the private archives of both Aldo Moro and Pietro Nenni, this article shows that from the mid-1950s onwards, important politicians—Socialist Pietro Nenni, Christian Democrat Giovanni Gronchi and Liberal Gaetano Martino—worked to encourage economic exchanges between Italy and China, and were linked with the concurrent initiatives of economic actors like Dino Gentili and Enrico Mattei. It also reveals that this gradual but steady process placed the China question firmly on the agenda of Italian parliamentary debates and government programmes as early as 1964. Finally, it shows that, while American diplomacy was still dominated by the Vietnam War and opposed any initiative towards Chinese recognition, in 1969–1970 the long process of rapprochement between Rome and Beijing came to an end. Thanks to Nenni's and Moro's diplomatic action, Italy recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the Americans decided to inaugurate triangular diplomacy and reach out to China.


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