Migration in the Medieval Mediterranean

<i>Migration in the Medieval Mediterranean</i> argues that the cross-Mediterranean movement of peoples was a central aspect of the medieval world. Medieval people migrated in search of safety after regime change, secure life amongst coreligionists, and prosperous careers. This kind of travel between Muslim and Christian regions demonstrates the mutual influences, interconnections, and communications linking them, surpassing the differences between the two civilizations.

Post-regime-change Afghan and Iraqi media systems: Strategic ambivalence as technology of media governance

This article investigates the governance of post-US invasion Afghan and Iraqi media systems by analyzing provisions pertinent to public broadcasting, licensing, and defamation in 14 laws and policy documents in the two nations. The author argues that the results point to a regime of regulatory ambivalence whereby state authorities have established an ontologically incongruent complex of legal and policy structures characterized by a simultaneous cohabitation of democratic and authoritarian tendencies. This ambivalence, born of struggles and contestations between state authorities, domestic civil societies and external supporters and donors, is a deliberate technology of media governance. The authoritarian tendencies of this regulatory regime have implications for media/journalists’ self-regulation as they are designed to curtail the agency of media institutions and journalists, and assert government control over speech and the flow of information.

A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power

The relationship between populism and democracy is a hotly debated topic. Some believe that populism is inherently bad for democracy because it is anti-pluralist and confrontational. Others argue that populism can reinvigorate worn-out democracies in need of an infusion of greater popular participation. This book advances this debate by examining the empirical relationship between populism in power and democracy. Does populism in power always lead to regime change, that is, the demise of democracy? The answer is no. The impact of populism on democracy depends on the variety of populism in power: the worst outcomes in democratic governance are found under unconstrained populism. This book discusses the conditions that explain how populism becomes unconstrained, and advances a dynamic theory of change that shows how the late victories of populists build on early ones, resulting in greater power asymmetries. The book analyzes five populist presidencies in the Andes. In four of them (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), populism became unconstrained and regime change followed. In one case, Colombia, populism in power was contained and democracy survived. The concluding chapter places the Andean cases in comparative perspective and discusses how unconstrained populism in other cases (Nicaragua and Hungary) also lead to the end of electoral democracy. Where populism in power was constrained (Honduras and the United States), regime change did not materialize. This book advances a theory of populism that help us understand how democracies transition into non-democracies. To that extent, the book illuminates the processes of democratic erosion in our time.

Introduction

The global rise of populism is driving a process of democratic erosion. Accordingly, scholarly attention has shifted from processes of democratization to de-democratization trajectories; or, how democracies perish after they have transitioned from authoritarianism. This chapter distinguishes between populism (a political strategy) and competitive authoritarianism (a regime type). The chapter enumerates the conceptual contributions of this book, primarily, that the rise to power of populism can lead to regime change by creating significant power asymmetries. However, while unconstrained populism in power can lead to hybrid regimes or even full-scale authoritarianism, strong judiciaries, and other institutional actors, can contain or constrain populism in power, preventing regime change. The chapter offers a new definition of populism that includes a governance dimension that is missing in other definitions and argues that Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, Álvaro Uribe, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa are examples of populism.

The Hobbesian Moment

This chapter reviews how once in power, populist leaders try to assert their political dominance, which is invariably contested by some societal and institutional actors, and shows how this moment of decisive political confrontation determines the ulterior trajectory of the populist government. If populist chief executives succeed during this moment, an aggrandized executive emerges and electoral democracy will transition to a hybrid regime; if they are defeated or constrained, the possibility of regime change is averted. The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that explain the failure or success of populist leaders in emerging victorious from this inflection point. The key permissive condition is voters’ support for radical institutional change. The key productive condition is the ability of populist leaders to use the state’s repressive apparatus to impose their political will. An additional productive condition is sometimes present: the organization and mobilization of low-income voters to support the populist project.

Conclusion

The chapter shows that the impact of populism on democracy depends on the variety of populism in power: the worst outcomes in democratic performance are found under unconstrained populism. By contrast, when populism in power is constrained, democracy will largely survive. To support this claim, the chapter traces two democracy indices under populism in power in the Andes, which as expected, show a marked deterioration of democracy under unconstrained populist governments, while remaining largely unchanged under contained populism. The central proposition of the theory—unconstrained populism in power leads to regime change whereas constrained populism does not—is then explored in cases beyond the Andes. The chapter finds examples of unconstrained populism in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega and Hungary under Viktor Orbán, their governments having transitioned away from democracy. In other cases where populism was constrained, that was not the case.