Competition and Antitrust Law: A Very Short Introduction

Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

Competition and Antitrust Law: A Very Short Introduction draws on case studies from across the EU and USA to examine the benefits of competition and the laws which safeguard competitive markets. Competitive markets deliver lower prices, better quality, abundance of choice, and increased innovation. But while competition benefits consumers, it can prove challenging for sellers and producers who may try to dampen the competitive process. This VSI elucidates the key challenges to competition — cartels and anti-competitive agreements, monopolies, and mergers — and looks at the policy considerations which affect competition law enforcement. There exists a delicate relationship between a free market economy and government intervention.

Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter examines the role of industrial policy in developing countries. On the one hand, industrial policy is arguably the antithesis of competition law and policy. Industrial policy substitutes government planning for competition and is vehemently opposed if not maligned by adherents of free market economics. Industrial policy as practiced in some countries such as Japan and Korea have entailed government-organized cartels and the grooming of national champions, both of which are direct affronts to the notion of competition. On the other hand, to the defenders of industrial policy, it has successfully lifted a number of Asian countries out of poverty and turned them into industrial and technological powerhouses. However, even the extent to which the success of these economies can be attributed to industrial policy is highly contested. There are hence two layers to the controversy. The first is whether industrial policy worked at all. The second is even if it did, whether a growth strategy relying on competition is superior to industrial policy, and if not, how competition law enforcement should accommodate industrial policy.


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota Chybowska ◽  
Leszek Chybowski ◽  
Valeri Souchkov

Abstract Poland has a strong ambition to evolve rapidly into a knowledge-driven economy. Since 2004, it has been the largest beneficiary of European Union cohesion policy funds among all member states. Between 2007 and 2013, Poland was allocated approximately EUR 67 billion, whereas for 2014-2020 the EU budget earmarked EUR 82.5 billion for Polish cohesion policy. This means that in the coming years, Poland’s R&D intensity will grow. But the question remains: is 27 years of free market economy enough to enable a country’s economy to become knowledge-based ? This paper offers an analysis of Polish R&D expenditures and investments in terms of their sources (business, government or higher education sectors), types (European Union or state aid) and areas of support (infrastructure, education or innovation). It also characterises the Polish R&D market with its strengths and weaknesses. Then, it examines the process of technology transfer in Poland, comparing it to best practice. Finally, the paper lays out the barriers to effective commercialisation that need to be overcome, and attempts to answer the question raised in its title.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 7-53
Author(s):  
Victoria Daskalova ◽  

Unfair trading practices (UTPs) imposed by parties with superior power in the context of a vertical relationship are an issue at the periphery of competition law, private law, and, sometimes, sectoral regulation. For a long time, the mainstream competition law approach has been to relegate such issues to other areas of law and regulation. In the EU, where complaints about the prevalence of such practices in the agricultural and food supply chain have been voiced for decades, the approach of the European Commission has been to pursue a strict separation between competition issues and fair-trading issues. This article questions the reasonableness of such a strict division of labour. Taking the sum of various initiatives undertaken to regulate UTPs in the agri-food supply chain as a case study, it argues that the effect of limiting competition law enforcement on this issue has been counterproductive. The article firstly explains the background of the problem and the issue of UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. Secondly, it maps the various legislative developments which have taken place at the EU Member State level. Thirdly, by referring to Grabosky’s (1995) regulatory studies typology of counterproductive regulation, the article focuses attention on some of the perverse side effects which arise when regulation of power imbalances and UTPs occurs at the national level in the context of an integrated market like the EU. In light of the analysis, it expresses doubt that these pitfalls will be fully corrected by Directive 2019/633 on UTPs in the food supply chain. The conclusion is that national legislative developments have not been able to make up for the lack of supra-national enforcement of EU competition law on this issue and have possibly even exacerbated the problem at hand. The article concludes that supranational competition law enforcement can play a key role in addressing the fundamental problems underlying business-to-business unfair trading practices. It argues that this role cannot be played by other instruments in the context of an integrated market with multi-level governance. This article shows that while competition law may not be capable of solving all the problems with UTPs, it remains indispensable in safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market as well as the interests of consumers and taxpayers.


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