REVIEW ARTICLE: GROWTH, RETURNS TO SCALE AND THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION

1998 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. RAVAGNANI
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Returns To Scale ◽  
Review Article ◽  
Theory Of Value

A Review of a Few Topics in Piezoelectricity

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 335-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiashi Yang
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Maxwell Equations ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Review Article ◽  
Potential Applications ◽  
Electromechanical Devices ◽  
Piezoelectric Semiconductors

This is a review article on a few special topics in piezoelectricity: gradient and nonlocal theories, fully dynamic theory with Maxwell equations, piezoelectric semiconductors, and motions of rotating piezoelectric bodies. They all require some extension of the classical theory of piezoelectricity. They are relatively new, more advanced, and growing subjects with applications or potential applications in various electromechanical devices. The article contains 209 references. (In memory of Raymond D. Mindlin (1906–1987)).

Notes on a Mischaracterization of the Classical Theory of Value

2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Ravagnani
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value

A Public Ownership Resolution of the Tragedy of the Commons

1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Roemer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Returns To Scale ◽  
Finite Size ◽  
The State ◽  
Fish Stock ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Distribution Of Fish

Imagine a society of fisherfolk, who, in the state of nature, fish on a lake of finite size. Fishing on the lake is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in labor, because the lake's finite size (and finite fish stock) imply that each successive hour of fishing labor is less effective than the previous one, as the remaining fish become less dense in the lake. In the state of nature, the lake is commonly owned: each fishes as much as he pleases, and, we might suppose, calculates his fishing plan by taking the labor of the others as given, as he sees it. Each knows that the distribution of fish will be proportional to labor expended among the fisherfolk: if I fish twice as long as you, I will end up with twice as much fish as you. This is not due to some kind of concern with equity (or the labor theory of value) among the fisherfolk; it is a technological fact, implied by the assumption that fishing labor is homogeneous, and all are equally likely to catch a fish in a unit of time. An equilibrium under common ownership can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium of the game where each computes his optimal fishing plan, given the labor of the others and knowing what the consequent distribution of fish would be. (A Nash equilibrium is an allocation of labor and fish to each fisherman, with the property that no one can increase his utility by deviating in his choice of labor, given what the others are doing.)

Samuel Bailey and the Subversion of the Classical Theory of Value: A Note

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. De Vivo
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value

Samuel Bailey and the Classical Theory of Value.

Economica ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 29 (114) ◽  
pp. 210
Author(s):  
Marian Bowley ◽  
R. M. Rauner
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value

The Classical Theory of Value and Distribution

2019 ◽  
pp. 3-39
Author(s):  
Lefteris Tsoulfidis ◽  
Persefoni Tsaliki
Keyword(s):  
Classical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value
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