Frenemies: Corporate Advertising Under Common Ownership

In this paper, we investigate the impact of ownership structure on corporate advertising expenditures. Using mutual fund mergers as an exogenous shock to ownership structure, we find that competing firms owned by the same institutional blockholders experience a significant reduction in advertising expenditure. The reduction in advertising expenditure is more likely to occur in the presence of higher coordination benefits or lower coordination costs. Specifically, this effect is more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries, in higher advertising-intensity industries, with greater common ownership, with more concentrated institutional ownership, and with headquarters located in the same state. Overall, our empirical evidence indicates that ownership by common institutional investors significantly affects corporate advertising strategy. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

Common Ownership Patterns in the European Banking Sector—The Impact of the Financial Crisis1

We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.

Law of Common Ownership in Connection with the Development of the Economy of the Collective Use of Goods and Services

It becomes urgent to resolve the issue of developing the institution of law of common ownership, as well as property law in general, regarding the fact that property law needs reforming that has not yet been implemented, due to the emergence, in the context of digitalization, of the economy of collective use of various goods (sharing, the economy of shared consumption), changes in the culture of consumption and the fact that not in all cases the acquisition of goods on the basis of sole ownership is economically justified. Users’ communities, whose members jointly acquire objects for their collective use, including objects in common ownership, can be considered as one of the forms of sharing. Peculiarities of exercising the right to common ownership in relation to property in the context of a sharing economy make it possible to talk about the possibility of separating an independent type of common property along with shared and joint property (for example, collective common property) or distinguishing a variety of common shared property—by analogy with the right of ownership to the common property of an apartment building. The peculiarities of the implementation of this type of common property can be enshrined in civil legislation.

Floor and Apartment Ownership System A vision for a New Legislative Organization in Iraqi Law

The system of ownership of floors and apartments represents a developed form of the forms of class ownership. In addition to the old image that prevailed in the old laws of the ownership of classes, represented by the system of ownership of the top and bottom, it appeared in Europe as a result of the acute housing crisis in which the system of ownership of floors and apartments occurred. The law was adopted The Egyptian civil system adopted this system, and from it the majority of laws in Arab countries were taken. This advanced system of tiered ownership is based on dividing the vertical building into tiers or apartments owned by multiple persons, separate ownership and common ownership in the building structure, its land and all the common parts intended for the common use of the owners. Although the Iraqi civil law did not adopt the system of ownership of floors and apartments in its texts, the Iraqi legislator tried to fill this legislative deficiency in the Real Estate Registration Law No. (43) of 1971, and despite that, the system of ownership of floors and apartments remained unorganized and constituted completely in Iraqi legislation, The Iraqi legislator has made many attempts to fill this shortcoming, the most recent of which was his issuance of the Law Regulating Ownership of Floors and Apartments in Buildings No. (61) of 2000. However, the change that Iraq witnessed after 2003 made it necessary to reconsider the legislative regulation of the system of ownership of floors and apartments, from During the development of a new regulation in line with the investment laws and instructions in Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. We have divided our research into three demands. In the first requirement, we discussed the legislative history of the ownership system of floors and apartments in Iraqi law. In the second requirement, we discussed the legal systems applied in the ownership of classes. As for the third requirement, we devoted it to discussing ways to manage the common parts in the system of ownership of floors and apartments. . We concluded our research, with a conclusion in which we mentioned the most important conclusions, the most important of which is the distinction of the system of ownership of floors and apartments from the system of ownership of the top and bottom, and the multiplicity of Iraqi laws that dealt with this system by organizing without the existence of a comprehensive law for all its provisions applicable to all parts of Iraq, and we suggested finding a new legal organization in the Iraqi legislation , by regulating the substantive provisions of the system of ownership of floors and apartments in the Iraqi civil law, and the necessity of developing a special law dealing with the detailed provisions of this system.

Moral Molecules: Morality as a Combinatorial System

What is morality? How many moral values are there? And what are they? According to the theory of morality-as-cooperation, morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory predicts that there will be as many different types of morality as there are different types of cooperation. Previous research, drawing on evolutionary game theory, has identified at least seven different types of cooperation, and used them to explain seven different types of morality: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. Here we explore the conjecture that these simple moral ‘elements’ combine to form a much larger number of more complex moral ‘molecules’, and that as such morality is a combinatorial system. For each combination of two elements, we hypothesise a candidate moral molecule, and successfully locate an example of it in the professional and popular literature. These molecules include: fraternity, blood revenge, family pride, filial piety, gavelkind, primogeniture, friendship, patriotism, tribute, diplomacy, common ownership, honour, confession, turn taking, restitution, modesty, mercy, munificence, arbitration, mendicancy, and queuing. These findings indicate that morality – like many other physical, biological, psychological and cultural systems – is indeed a combinatorial system. Thus morality-as-cooperation provides a principled and powerful theory, that explains why there are many moral values, and successfully predicts what they will be; and it generates a systematic framework that has the potential to explain all moral ideas, possible and actual. Pursuing the many implications of this theory will help to place the study of morality on a more secure scientific footing.

22. Easements

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter is concerned with easements. An easement is the proprietary right to enjoy limited use of the land of another, which may exist in both positive and negative form. To constitute an easement, a right over the land of another must display certain characteristics. If these characteristics are not present, the right over the land of another is merely a personal right. An easement may be created by express, implied, or presumed grant. As a proprietary right, an easement is not easy to extinguish, but, in the case of freehold land, easement will be extinguished where the dominant and servient land come into common ownership and an easement attached to a lease may sometimes be extinguished upon the termination of that lease.

Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017

We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm. (JEL D22, G32, G34, L21, L25)