6. Parties to crime

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Law Enforcement Officers ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Crime Victims ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
Innocent Agency ◽  
Joint Enterprise ◽  
Secondary Liability

A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an offence is criminally liable and known as an ‘accessory’ or a ‘secondary party’. This chapter focuses on the basis of their liability, the distinction between accessories and principals, how secondary liability differs from inchoate liability, the principal offender, innocent agency, the accessory’s actus reus, whether an omission is sufficient and whether mere presence at the crime is enough. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court decision in Jogee, examining problems of ‘joint enterprise liability’, issues of terminology, the significance of the doctrine of joint enterprise in murder and why the Supreme Court characterized it as involving a ‘wrong turn’. It also deals with withdrawal by a secondary party before the principal offender commits the crime, victims as parties to crime, and instigation by law enforcement officers for the purpose of entrapment.

6. Parties to crime

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-247
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Law Enforcement Officers ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Crime Victims ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
Innocent Agency ◽  
Joint Enterprise ◽  
Secondary Liability

A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an offence is criminally liable and known as an ‘accessory’ or a ‘secondary party’. This chapter focuses on the basis of their liability, the distinction between accessories and principals, how secondary liability differs from inchoate liability, the principal offender, innocent agency, the accessory’s actus reus, whether an omission is sufficient and whether mere presence at the crime is enough. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court decision in Jogee, examining problems of ‘joint enterprise liability’, issues of terminology, the significance of the doctrine of joint enterprise in murder and why the Supreme Court characterized it as involving a ‘wrong turn’. It also deals with withdrawal by a secondary party before the principal offender commits the crime, victims as parties to crime and instigation by law enforcement officers for the purpose of entrapment.

Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Criminal Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Road Traffic ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Mental Condition ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Secondary Liability

This book, in its fifteenth edition, has been completely updated to include all legislative and case law developments and detailed analysis of the many recent developments since the last edition. In particular, there has been a significant revision of the chapter dealing with secondary liability and joint enterprise following the decision of the Supreme Court in Jogee. The material on dishonesty has also been rewritten following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos. Changes brought about through the Policing and Crime Act 2017 and Criminal Finances Act 2017 have been incorporated. The book begins with an introduction of definitions of crime and an explanation of the sources of criminal law followed by detailed analysis of the elements of a crime (actus reus and mens rea) including negligence and strict liability. Secondary liability is examined with an emphasis on analysing the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jogee, before exploring corporate and vicarious liability. Mental condition defences and the Law Commission’s proposals to reform them are examined alongside issues relating to mistake and intoxication. A comprehensive review of general defences includes the Court of Appeal’s controversial approach to self-defence in householder cases. The final chapter of the general part provides a detailed review of inchoate offences. The second part of the book examines specific offences including murder, manslaughter, other homicide offences, non-fatal offences, sexual offences, theft, and robbery, and considers the Fraud Act 2006, burglary, offences of damages to property, offences against public order and road traffic offences.

Odpowiedzialność karna za przestępne współdziałanie w prawie angielskim po wyroku R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen

2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 98-121
Author(s):  
Piotr Brzostek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law ◽  
Joint Enterprise ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Secondary Liability

The combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen caused upheaval in the English law on criminal complicity. The Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on criminal complicity „took a wrong turn” 33 years ago in the Privy Council ruling in Chan Wing-Siu which concerned a controversial doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. According to the said doctrine, if A and B set out to commit a crime X (e.g. robbery) and B foresees that A might commit crime Y (e.g. murder) in the course of committing crime X, B will be liable for crime Y, even if he does not intend that crime Y be committed. The mere fact of foresight on B’s part is enough for him to be criminally liable. Decision in Jogee; Ruddock is of seminal importance as it overturned the doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. It is doubtful, however, to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved the problems that have bedeviled this area of law. This article presents in outline the English law on criminal complicity and attempts to assess the changes that were introduced in Jogee; Ruddock. A number of issues still call for further refinement and resolution. It appears, however, that the emphasis the Supreme Court put on intention as a required standard of fault, draws, at least superficially, the continental (Polish and German) and English criminal law closer together in terms of mens rea requirements for secondary liability.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document