Odpowiedzialność usługodawcy za udostępnianie w internetowych serwisach społecznościowych treści przestępnych związanych z publicznym propagowaniem faszystowskiego lub innego totalitarnego ustroju państwa według projektu ustawy o ochronie wolności słowa w

Having in mind the Law on the Provision of Electronic Services, the article presents selected issues in the field of strict liability of the service provider in the form of administrative penalties for publishing on social media criminal content or content that is related to it, in the form of praising or exhorting to commit the crime prohibited under Art. 256 of the Penal Code according to the Draft of the Law on the Protection of Freedom of Speech on Social Media. It presents selected issues concerning inaccuracies and imprecise definitions of the notions of service provider, user, and illegal content, especially in the context of content that does not exhaust the features of a prohibited act under Art. 256 of the Penal Code. It describes also the procedure to be followed in the event of the user’s complaint about blocking their content, profile or a complaint about disseminating illegal content. The author concludes that the assessment of illegal content that does not exhaust the features of a crime under Art. 256 of the Penal Code, but is related to it, in the form of praising or exhorting to commit it, will belong to the Freedom of Speech Committee. Additionally, the regulations of the Law on the Provision of Electronic Services and the Draft of the Law on the Protection of Freedom of Speech on Social Media are inconsistent because, on one hand, after the so-called flagging of the content on social media, the service provider is obliged to remove illegal content (Art. 14 of the Law on the Provision of Electronic Services), while, on the other hand, according to the commented draft of the law, he is exposed to proceedings before the Freedom of Speech Committee and its arbitrary classification of content as legal or illegal.

Corporate Criminal Liability in India

In 21st Century, crimes committed by corporate bodies are creating more serious challenge for criminal justice system. Some vested interests which are controlling affairs of corporate bodies misuse the corporate body for commission of criminal acts to maximise profit. Corporate body is conferred with legal personality for regulation of its functions but it does not have physical body and mind of its own, thereby, problem arises for holding corporate body as criminal, and further, in imposition of criminal liability. Corporate criminal activities badly affect environment, health, safety and infra-structure development. Corporate entities are involved in corruption, forgery, money laundering, foreign exchange violations, money laundering, tax evasions, benami property transactions and other economic offences. Proper formulation of criminal justice actions and effective enforcement of corporate criminal liabilities are modern criminal justice requirements. Corporate bodies are business entities; economic wellbeing of society, prosperity of citizenry and development of nation depend on freedom of trade, amicable business environment and least regulation of corporate entities. Hereby, in determination and imposition of corporate criminal liability for betterment of society, it is necessary to make balance between to take stern actions to tackle corporate crimes and to take care to not hamper legitimate activities of corporate bodies. Law relating to corporate criminal liability in India will be analysed in this paper. Keywords: Criminal Justice System, Corporate crime, Corporate criminal liability, Natural person, Social wellbeing, Strict liability

Prosecutorial Discretion in Tackling the Cryptocurrency Crime in Indonesia

Data, reports, and information show that cryptocurrency has supported certain parties as a convenience, whereas the purpose of cryptocurrency is to minimize the weaknesses of conventional money systems in international relations in the current era of globalization. Countries that cannot represent or apply autonomous law in facing cryptocurrency challenges, because it is feared it is increasingly difficult to overcome global cryptocurrency crime. It is precisely in eradicating cryptocurrency crime, law enforcement authorities, priorities of prosecutors who have the highest supremacy in the field of prosecution and other discretion in law enforcement must be dynamic in law enforcement against facilitators from responses to social needs and aspirations, in accordance with legal considerations must acknowledge the wishes of the community and agree in achieving substantive justice. Considering that virtual currency has been banned in Indonesia but crypto-asset trading on the futures exchange has been in force, responsive discretionary prosecutions are needed in combating cryptocurrency crime in Indonesia. Liability that exceeds liability based on faults, namely strict liability, vicarious liability, and secondary liability to any parties that cause cryptocurrency crime can be applied to the mechanism of "follow the money" and "trace the information and communication technologies (ICTs) footprint". It is hoped that prosecution discretion by the prosecutor can reach to the monitoring of suspicious "nodes" and monitoring the registration of ICTs that are vulnerable to cryptocurrency crimes, such as laptops, cellphones, computers, and SIM cards, in providing a deterrent effect to the perpetrators of cryptocurrency crime.

Vicarious Liability Under a Strict Liability Rule

In this article, we extend the model of Newman, H., and D. Wright. 1990. “Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model.” International Review of Law and Economics 10: 219–231 and strengthens their result that the strict liability can attain social optimum in a principal-agent relation to the situation in which the court appreciates any contractual terms regarding apportionment of damages between an employer and an employee under vicarious liability rule. Our model also generalizes and extends vicarious liability to the negligence-based liability rule.

Public Interest Disclosure in Labuan Offshore Banking: Is Statutory Intervention Necessary?

Such inquiry like the recent Pandora Papers requires further legislative measure in offshore banking. While banking secrecy is legitimate privacy and viable, it has different character to tax evasion and money laundering activities. This article attempts to analyse public interest disclosure, onshore and offshore banking secrecy law from the perspective of statutory and judicial approaches. Statutory and judicial approaches show that banking secrecy is regarded as strict liability offense in onshore banking. The question arises whether public interest disclosure should be allowed as statutory intervention in Labuan offshore in response to a case like Pandora Papers? This research employs doctrinal analysis to unearth and address a necessary legislative measure for further development in descriptive and prescriptive manner. From the findings, it is evident that statutory intervention is deemed required to assist public interest disclosure for further inquiry and the general rule banking secrecy stated in Section 178 of the Labuan Financial and Securities Services Act 2010 (ACT 704) and Section 139 of the Labuan Islamic Financial and Securities Services Act 2010 (ACT 704). In this case, extensive provisions should be addressed in Section 178 of the Labuan Financial and Securities Services Act 2010 and Section 139 of the Labuan Islamic Financial and Securities Services Act 2010 regarding public interest disclosure within Malaysian offshore context that is fundamentally distinctive from the onshore banking. The forthcoming legislative measure is necessary to prevent such further sail in offshore banking.

BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE ‒ THE ACTIO DE PAUPERIE REVISITED Van Meyeren v Cloete (636/2019) [2020] ZASCA 100 (11 September 2020)

It is trite that the South African law of delict follows a generalising approach. This entails that liability will only ensue when all the elements of delict are present. South African law does not recognise individual “delicts”. The generalising approach followed in South African law is qualified in that there are three main delictual actions, namely the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss; the actio inuriarum for loss arising from intentional infringements of personality rights; and the Germanic action for pain and suffering, in terms of which a plaintiff can claim compensation for negligent infringements of the physical-mental integrity. This approach is further qualified in that numerous actions dating back to Roman law still exist in our law today. Included in this mix are the actions for harm caused by animals, such as the actio de pauperie, the actio de pastu, and the actio de feris, each with its own requirements. There have been questions as to whether these actions, in particular the actio de pauperie, still form part of South African law. In Loriza Brahman v Dippenaar (2002 (2) SA 477 (SCA) 487) the defendant claimed that the actio was no longer part of the South African law. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) per Olivier JA held that the actio de pauperie had been part of South African law for more than 24 centuries and not fallen into disuse. Olivier JA held that the fact that the action is based on strict liability (one of the arguments raised against it) is no reason to ban it from South African law as strict liability was increasing and in suitable instances fulfils a useful function.The SCA, again, recently confirmed the continued existence of the action in South African law in the case of Van Meyeren v Cloete ((636/2019) [2020] ZASCA 100 (11 September 2020) 40). In this case, the SCA had to decide whether to extend the defences against liability in terms of the actio de pauperie to the negligence of a third party that was not in control of the animal. The defendant held that the court should develop the common law in this regard. Considering both case law and the requirements for the development of the common law, the SCA held that such an extension could not be justified.

Safe harbour: Should we be worried? An analysis of Clause 20 of the Harmful Digital Communications Bill, and its application to the law of defamation

<p>Liability of internet intermediaries for content created by third parties is a contentious area of defamation law. Recently, the law in New Zealand has begun to depart from English law, and move closer to strict liability. Parliament has responded with a ‘safe harbour’ in clause 20 of the Harmful Digital Communications Bill, which will provide online content hosts with conditional immunity from liability for content created by others. The author supports the creation of a legislative safe harbour for internet intermediaries, but highlights a number of deficiencies with clause 20 as currently drafted. This paper analyses the existing law, including possible defences, and clause 20. It also looks to other jurisdictions’ safe harbours, and concludes with recommendations on how clause 20 ought to be improved.</p>

Safe harbour: Should we be worried? An analysis of Clause 20 of the Harmful Digital Communications Bill, and its application to the law of defamation

<p>Liability of internet intermediaries for content created by third parties is a contentious area of defamation law. Recently, the law in New Zealand has begun to depart from English law, and move closer to strict liability. Parliament has responded with a ‘safe harbour’ in clause 20 of the Harmful Digital Communications Bill, which will provide online content hosts with conditional immunity from liability for content created by others. The author supports the creation of a legislative safe harbour for internet intermediaries, but highlights a number of deficiencies with clause 20 as currently drafted. This paper analyses the existing law, including possible defences, and clause 20. It also looks to other jurisdictions’ safe harbours, and concludes with recommendations on how clause 20 ought to be improved.</p>