Regeneron and Illumina: a case for (and against) ranges

Insufficiency in patents, especially in emerging and complex technologies, can be a real problem for patent applicants. They are keen to progress to filing for obvious reasons and yet are expected to disclose how the invention works to its fullest extent. Problems arise in cases where a patent claim seeks to reserve a range of some sort. Recent judgments of the English Patents Court and the UK Supreme Court have suggested that this is not a trivial problem in most cases of analysis. The upshot appears to be that a range patent is not to be struck down as insufficient simply because a range exists. Much depends upon the importance of the range to the claim or, in the Illumina case, whether mention or the existence of a range is in any way relevant. An analysis of two recent judgments in the UK concerning sufficiency of disclosure sheds considerable light on the current ambit of legal thinking in this area of patent law.

Breakthrough in Parent Company Liability

Two English and two Dutch cases have recently clarified the (potential) liability of parent companies vis-à-vis third parties in relation to damage caused by their subsidiaries. They concern the decisions of the UK Supreme Court in Vedanta v Lungowe and Okpabi v Shell, the Hague Court of Appeal in Oguru v Shell and the Hague District Court in Milieudefensie v Shell (climate change case).

Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

The ‘reasonable patient’ of 2025 envisioned (Preprint)

UNSTRUCTURED . The verdict of the UK Supreme court in the case of Bellman versus Boojum-Snark Integrated Care Trust (2025) will have profound implications for all medical practice, medical education and medical research, as well as the regulation of medicine and allied healthcare fields. Major changes will result from the judgment made in favour of Bellman’s negligence claim, reflecting an expanded and more precise definition of informed and preference-based consent, compared with that in Montgomery (2015) and also with the principles laid out in the UK GMC guidance on Decision Making and Consent (2020). (In case of doubt, this is a vision paper.)

Consent for septoplasty: Are we meeting patients’ expectations?

The requirements for informed consent were modified in 2015 following the UK Supreme Court judgment of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. This marked a decisive shift from the traditional paternalistic ‘doctor knows best' model towards a more patient-centred approach. This study examines the current standard of consent for septoplasty and whether it complies with the law. We also report whether the ‘reasonable patient’ and surgeon agree about which risks should be discussed during the consent process. Ten complications were identified as common or serious via a literature search. Using questionnaires, 21 Ears, Nose and Throat surgeons were asked which of these they routinely discussed, and 103 patients were asked how seriously they regarded those complications. Results were compared using the Test of Proportions. Most surgeons routinely discuss all risks except negative change in sense of smell and numbness of upper incisors. The ‘reasonable patient’ regarded these two complications as serious or very serious. However, less than 70% of surgeons mentioned them. A significant proportion of Ears, Nose and Throat surgeons do not routinely mention all the risks that the ‘reasonable patient' would want to know about before undergoing a septoplasty. This may result in more clinical negligence claims, as managing a patient's reasonable expectations is an important factor.

Re Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7, Supreme Court

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Re Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7, UK Supreme Court. This case concerns first, the law relating to legitimate expectations, and second the requirements to establish an Article 2-compliant investigation into a death. The facts of the case are connected to the murder of Patrick Finucane by loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in the United Kingdom

This chapter focuses on administrative procedure and judicial review in the United Kingdom. Initially, it should be stressed that administrative law is different across the UK due to devolution. The UK Supreme Court generally acts as a final court of harmonizing case-law principles. As the UK constitution is uncodified, the existence of constitutional provisions concerning judicial review remains somewhat controversial, but the necessity of judicial review is thought to be required by the rule of law. The scope of judicial review is generally governed by judicial precedent. Under section 84 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the High Court must refuse to grant a remedy 'if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred'. In general, there is no right on judicial review to claim damages for losses caused by unlawful administrative actions. It is usually only possible to receive damages in judicial review claims if there is another established cause of action, separate to the ground for judicial review.

3. Duty of care: basic principles

This chapter begins by tracing the development of the duty of care starting with the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]. It goes on to consider the various general tests developed and used by the courts in order to establish when a duty of care is owed. Finally, the chapter discusses the ‘incremental and by analogy’ and so-called Caparo three-stage ‘test’ established by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] and recently reconsidered by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018].