Empty Institutions in Global Environmental Politics

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 626-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radoslav S Dimitrov

AbstractWhy are some institutions without any policy powers or output? This study documents the efforts by governments to create empty international institutions whose mandates deprive them of any capacity for policy formulation or implementation. Examples include the United Nations Forum on Forests, the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change, and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. Research is based on participation in twenty-one rounds of negotiations over ten years and interviews with diplomats, policymakers, and observers. The article introduces the concept of empty institutions, provides evidence from three empirical cases, theorizes their political functions, and discusses theoretical implications and policy ramifications. Empty institutions are deliberately designed not to deliver and serve two purposes. First, they are political tools for hiding failure at negotiations, by creating a public impression of policy progress. Second, empty institutions are “decoys” that distract public scrutiny and legitimize collective inaction, by filling the institutional space in a given issue area and by neutralizing pressures for genuine policy. Contrary to conventional academic wisdom, institutions can be raised as obstacles that preempt governance rather than facilitate it.

Author(s):  
Alexander Ovodenko

This chapter concludes the book by summarizing the validity of the hypotheses tested in the empirical chapters, assessing the overall explanatory power of the markets theory, identifying the theoretical and empirical contributions of the book, and outlining specific avenues for future research on international institutions and global environmental politics. It situates the theoretical and empirical contributions in the literatures on environmental regulation and collective action, reiterating the many impacts of market structures on global regime design. Scholars of global environmental politics should draw from research on American politics to understand institutional design and should focus on policy schemes that would mitigate pollution from competitive sectors, especially in developing countries.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mason

Transboundary and global environmental harm present substantial challenges to state-centered (territorial) modalities of accountability and responsibility. The globalization of environmental degradation has triggered regulatory responses at various jurisdictional scales. These governance efforts, featuring various articulations of state and/or private authority, have struggled to address so-called “accountability deficits” in global environmental politics. Yet, it has also become clear that accountability and responsibility norms forged in domestic regulatory contexts cannot simply be transposed across borders. This special issue explores various conceptual perspectives on accountability and responsibility for transnational harm, and examines their application to different actor groups and environmental governance regimes. This introductory paper provides an overview of the major theoretical positions and examines some of the analytical challenges raised by the transnational (re)scaling of accountability and responsibility norms.


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