Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne. Edited by Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Browner.

The chapter discusses the subject of values and moral judgement. This begins with what is meant by values, and whether or not they can be objective and absolute. The main business of the chapter is to present a philosophical argument about the nature of this area. The argument shows that the existence of a standard which can properly command the allegiance of all free agents can be neither proved nor disproved using the tools of reason and logic. It is argued that the absence of such a standard would tend towards isolation of individuals from one another. Finally, it is pointed out that what people are most drawn to and value highest is not well captured in terms of purely impersonal abstractions. This is a pointer towards the journey beyond atheism. The interplay of reason and faith is then discussed.

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Swinburne's Space and TimeSpace and Time. Richard Swinburne

Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1086/288721 ◽

1976 ◽

Vol 43 (4) ◽

pp. 618-637 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Paul Fitzgerald

Keyword(s):

Richard Swinburne

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Reason and Faith Revisited: The Aquinas Lecture, 1971 by Francis H. Parker

The Thomist A Speculative Quarterly Review ◽

10.1353/tho.1972.0036 ◽

1972 ◽

Vol 36 (1) ◽

pp. 163-166

Author(s):

William N. Christensen ◽

John King-Farlow

Keyword(s):

Reason And Faith

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Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412514000523 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 52 (1) ◽

pp. 45-61 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

CALUM MILLER

Keyword(s):

Simple Theory ◽

Ceteris Paribus ◽

Simple Hypothesis ◽

Richard Swinburne ◽

In Virtue Of

AbstractOne reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory – and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories,ceteris paribus – is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been championed by Richard Swinburne in recent years. I outline the objections to this line of argument present in the literature, and suggest some novel resources open to Swinburne in defence. I then argue that scientists' preference for universal nomological propositions constitutes a very strong reason for supposing that theism is simpler than parodical alternatives in virtue of its positing omni-properties rather than parallel ‘mega-properties’.

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Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne

Mind ◽

10.1093/mind/fzu097 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 124 (493) ◽

pp. 387-390

Author(s):

B. Berofsky

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Richard Swinburne

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