Skeptical Theism

This chapter critically examines skeptical theism, roughly the point of view that God exists but that God’s reasons for permitting evils are beyond our abilities to discern. Matters addressed include the epistemic import of appearances of pointlessness, the skeptical theses and analogies for the human condition with respect to apparently pointless evils defended by Michael Bergmann, and concerns about skeptical spread. The chapter provides support for the idea that, if there were God-justifying reasons for evils, we would see them, thereby defending a key premise in the argument from pointless evils and the argument from facts about evil.

Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower, eds. Reason & Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne

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Radically insensitive theists

Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils – that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmann's attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.

Why Skeptical Theists are Not Involved in a Scenario of Olly-Style Deception

According to Michael Bergmann, Skeptical Theism consists of two components: firstly, the belief that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good immaterial person who created the world, and secondly, the skeptical claim that we have no reason to believe that the possible goods and evils we know of are representative of the goods and evils that exist. According to the Global Skepticism Objection, Skeptical Theism entails that we should not be surprised if we are radically deceived by God: there just might be a greater good that can figure in a reason God has for deceiving us about reality. In support of this objection, Stephen Law presents an amusing analogy involving Olly and his reality-projector. In this paper, I outline the Global Skepticism Objection and Law’s case in support of it. I then respond by arguing that the scope of Skeptical Theism should be restricted, and seek to justify this through a narrower construal of Theism and an appeal to common sense.