From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism: On Some relations between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Theo A. F. Kuipers

Mind ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 110 (439) ◽  
pp. 774-777
Author(s):  
I. Niiniluoto
2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Festa ◽  
Atocha Aliseda ◽  
Jeanne Peijnenburg

Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Madzia

AbstractThe paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”


Synthese ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo A. F. Kuipers
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document