Individual incentives and workers’ contracts: evidence from a field experiment

Oxford Economic Papers ◽

10.1093/oep/gpz061 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

M Ali Choudhary ◽

Vasco J Gabriel ◽

Neil Rickman

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Incentive Pay ◽

Current Season ◽

Present Evidence ◽

Tournament Theory ◽

Piece Rates

Abstract We present evidence on the operation of incentive pay from a field experiment in Pakistan, looking at piece rates and pay based on rank achieved in a tournament. Importantly, some workers are in contracts ‘tying’ them to the employer for several picking seasons; others are ‘untied’, in the sense of being employed for only the current season. We find that incentive pay (of either type) improves productivity by 30%, on average, but that there are important differences across the types of workers: in particular, tournament incentives are less effective amongst the tied workers. We suggest that our main results have implications for tournament theory and the design of incentive pay schemes, particularly with regard to the fact that they may discourage some workers and, thus, reduce incentives.

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Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.1111/0034-6527.00294 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 71 (2) ◽

pp. 513-534 ◽

Cited By ~ 183

Author(s):

Bruce Shearer

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Piece Rates

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The Evolution of Cooperative Norms: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy ◽

10.2202/1538-0637.1484 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 5 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Oriana Bandiera ◽

Iwan Barankay ◽

Imran Rasul

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Farm Workers ◽

Negative Externality ◽

Incentive Scheme ◽

Short Term ◽

Natural Field ◽

Worker Behavior ◽

Natural Field Experiment ◽

Individual Effort ◽

Piece Rates

Abstract We document the establishment and evolution of a cooperative norm among workers using evidence from a natural field experiment on a leading UK farm. Workers are paid according to a relative incentive scheme under which increasing individual effort raises a worker's own pay but imposes a negative externality on the pay of all co-workers, thus creating a rationale for cooperation. As a counterfactual, we analyze worker behavior when workers are paid piece rates and thus have no incentive to cooperate.We find that workers cooperate more as their exposure to the relative incentive scheme increases. We also find that individual and group exposure are substitutes, namely workers who work alongside colleagues with higher exposure cooperate more. Shocks to the workforce in the form of new worker arrivals disrupt cooperation in the short term but are then quickly integrated into the norm. Individual exposure, group exposure, and the arrival of new workers have no effect on productivity when workers and paid piece rates and there is no incentive to cooperate.

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The Impacts of Microfinance: Evidence from Joint-Liability Lending in Mongolia

American Economic Journal Applied Economics ◽

10.1257/app.20130489 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 90-122 ◽

Cited By ~ 81

Author(s):

Orazio Attanasio ◽

Britta Augsburg ◽

Ralph De Haas ◽

Emla Fitzsimons ◽

Heike Harmgart

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Food Consumption ◽

Positive Impact ◽

Working Hours ◽

Female Entrepreneurship ◽

Joint Liability ◽

Present Evidence ◽

Household Food ◽

Randomized Field Experiment ◽

Household Food Consumption

We present evidence from a randomized field experiment in rural Mongolia to assess the poverty impacts of a joint-liability microcredit program targeted at women. We find a positive impact of access to group loans on female entrepreneurship and household food consumption but not on total working hours or income in the household. A simultaneously introduced individual-liability microcredit program delivers no significant poverty impacts. Additional results on informal transfers to families and friends suggest that joint liability may deter borrowers from using loans for noninvestment purposes with stronger impacts as a result. We find no difference in repayment rates between both types of microcredit. (JEL G21, I32, I38, J16, L26, O15, O16)

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Comparing Charitable Fundraising Schemes: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment and a Structural Model

American Economic Journal Economic Policy ◽

10.1257/pol.20120312 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 326-369 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Steffen Huck ◽

Imran Rasul ◽

Andrew Shephard

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Structural Model ◽

Intensive Margin ◽

Present Evidence ◽

Natural Field ◽

Natural Field Experiment ◽

Opera House ◽

Shed Light

We present evidence from a natural field experiment and structural model to shed light on the efficacy of alternative fundraising schemes. In conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera, we mailed 25,000 opera attendees a letter describing a charitable fundraising project organized by the opera house. Recipients were randomly assigned to treatments designed to explore responses to fundraising schemes varying in: the presence of a lead donor; and how individual donations would be matched using the lead donation. The structural model estimates extensive and intensive margin responses, and is then utilized to predict giving behavior in counterfactual fundraising schemes. (JEL C93, D64, L31, L82)

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A Quick Visual Mind Can be a Slow Auditory Mind

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169.56.1.33 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 56 (1) ◽

pp. 33-40 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

Sander Martens ◽

Addie Johnson ◽

Martje Bolle ◽

Jelmer Borst

Keyword(s):

Attentional Blink ◽

Task Difficulty ◽

Human Mind ◽

Visual Modality ◽

Present Evidence ◽

Conscious Level ◽

Visual Targets ◽

Concurrent Information

The human mind is severely limited in processing concurrent information at a conscious level of awareness. These temporal restrictions are clearly reflected in the attentional blink (AB), a deficit in reporting the second of two targets when it occurs 200–500 ms after the first. However, we recently reported that some individuals do not show a visual AB, and presented psychophysiological evidence that target processing differs between “blinkers” and “nonblinkers”. Here, we present evidence that visual nonblinkers do show an auditory AB, which suggests that a major source of attentional restriction as reflected in the AB is likely to be modality-specific. In Experiment 3, we show that when the difficulty in identifying visual targets is increased, nonblinkers continue to show little or no visual AB, suggesting that the presence of an AB in the auditory but not in the visual modality is not due to a difference in task difficulty.

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