Identity
This chapter expounds, formulates in analytical style, and defends Locke’s general view of identity. It interprets Locke’s puzzling statement that existing at the same time and place isn’t necessary for synchronic identity. It focuses mainly, following Locke, on diachronic identity. Locke never suggests that X is diachronically identical with Y iff they house the same substance-substratum; indeed his account of diachronic identity undermines the argument from change for substance-substratum. For Locke, X is diachronically identical with Y iff X is spatiotemporally continuous with Y, and every segment of the space-time path between X and Y is occupied either by something of the same sort as X or by something of the same sort as Y. This account applies to inanimate objects, plants, and animals. Its appeal to sortals makes it a version of the “relative identity” view. The chapter defends that view against the charge that it is self-contradictory.