Responsibility and Omissions
Keyword(s):
Mark Ravizza and John Martin Fischer have previously offered an account of moral responsibility for omissions. On this account, the conditions for such responsibility are parallel in an important way to the conditions for moral responsibility for actions: that is, neither responsibility for actions nor responsibility for omissions requires access to alternative possibilities. This helps in the semicompatibilist project (i.e., to show that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism). This chapter seeks to address some salient critiques of the account proposed by Ravizza and Fischer, especially in recent work by Randolph Clarke, Carolina Sartorio, and Philip Swenson.
2010 ◽
Vol 40
(3)
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pp. 411-432
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1992 ◽
Vol 22
(4)
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pp. 485-502
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2002 ◽
Vol 32
(4)
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pp. 587-606
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2005 ◽
Vol 35
(3)
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pp. 387-406
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Keyword(s):
2019 ◽