Agnosticism about Moral Responsibility

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Byrd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Mark Ravizza ◽  
Source Incompatibilism

Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 and 2002; van Inwagen 1983: 182-8; and Zagzebski 2000). Incompatibilists of this stripe are generally motivated by the concern that, if determinism is true, we are not genuine or ultimate sources of our actions and, hence, we are not responsible for what we do. Following Michael McKenna (2001), I shall call this view source incompatibilism. While the source incompatibilist's concern is rather vague as stated, it has given rise to a powerful argument against any attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have labeled this the Direct Argument, as it avoids the detour of alternative possibilities.

Responsibility and Omissions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Martin Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Mark Ravizza ◽  
Randolph Clarke

Mark Ravizza and John Martin Fischer have previously offered an account of moral responsibility for omissions. On this account, the conditions for such responsibility are parallel in an important way to the conditions for moral responsibility for actions: that is, neither responsibility for actions nor responsibility for omissions requires access to alternative possibilities. This helps in the semicompatibilist project (i.e., to show that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism). This chapter seeks to address some salient critiques of the account proposed by Ravizza and Fischer, especially in recent work by Randolph Clarke, Carolina Sartorio, and Philip Swenson.

Compatibilist Alternatives

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keim Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Source Theory

This paper is a defense of traditional compatibilism. Traditional compatibilism is, roughly, the view that (a) free will is essential to moral responsibility, (b) free will requires alternative possibilities of action, or alternatives for short, and (c) moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Traditional compatibilism is a version of the traditional theory of free will. According to the traditional theory, a person S performed an action a freely only if S could have done otherwise, that is, only if S had alternatives. The traditional theory is often contrasted with the source theory: S performed a freely only if S was the source of a (McKenna 2001; Pereboom 2003). One may adopt a combined view of free will that sanctions both the traditional and source theories (Kane 1996, 72-3; van Inwagen 1983). As I use the terms ‘source theorist’ and ‘traditional theorist,’ the former refers to folks who accept the source theory and reject the traditional theory; the latter refers to folks who accept the traditional theory whether or not they accept the source theory.

ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Michael Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Flicker Of Freedom

Abstract:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

A Riddle Regarding Omissions

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Responsibility Attributions ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
In Virtue Of

John Martin Fischer has recently proposed that actions and omissions are asymmetric with respect to the requirement of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility: whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require freedom to refrain from performing the action, moral responsibility for failure to perform an action does require freedom to perform the action. In what follows, I first critically assess Fischer's asymmetry principle. In arguing against the principle, I raise some concerns about Fischer's association of responsibility with control. I then motivate a riddle regarding omissions: some cases appear to show that a person is not responsible for failing to bring about something in virtue of the fact that the person could not bring about that thing. Other cases, though, seemingly show that a person is responsible for failing to bring about something even though the person could not bring about that thing. What explains the asymmetry in responsibility attributions in these cases involving omissions? Third, I consider some answers to this riddle and explain why they are inadequate. Finally, I sketch my own answer.

scholarly journals Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 131-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Rychter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

scholarly journals Blockage Cases: No Case against PAP

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (104) ◽  
pp. 109-120
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya Espí
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
Plausible Condition

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples ("Frankfurt cases") in which a counterfactual, and unactivated, device ensures that the agent will decide and do what she actually decides and does on her own, if she shows some sign that she is going to decide and do something else. Problems with these cases have led some thinkers to design examples in which the counterfactual factor is replaced by a device that actually blocks alternative possibilities. I argue that, even if these cases did not illicitly assume determinism, they are not successful against PAP anyway, for they violate a plausible condition on moral responsibility that Fischer has called "reasons-responsiveness".

scholarly journals Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 287-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Matheson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Van Inwagen

Abstract Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative possibilities has focused on Frankfurt’s argument against this claim, I instead focus on one of Dennett’s (1984) arguments against it. This argument appeals to cases of volitional necessity rather than cases featuring counterfactual interveners. van Inwagen (1989) and Kane (1996) appeal to the notion of ‘character setting’ to argue that these cases do not show that the power to do otherwise is unnecessary for moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that their character setting response is unsuccessful.

Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

In ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Harry Frankfurt introduces a scenario aimed at showing that the having of alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility. According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she could have done otherwise; Frankfurt thinks his scenario shows that PAP is, in fact, false. Frankfurt also thinks that the denial of PAP gives credence to compatibilism, the thesis that an agent could both be causally determined in all her actions and yet be morally responsible. Since its introduction, Frankfurt's original example has generated a voluminous literature, including a plethora of other, more complicated, Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs).

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