The Doctrine of Virtue as a Doctrine of Ends

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter concerns the first three sections of Kant’s dedicated introduction to Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals—The Doctrine of Virtue. Section 1 of the chapter explains why, according to Kant, there must be a doctrine of virtue as a part of a more comprehensive doctrine of morals. Section 2 explains why ethics is both a doctrine of virtue and a doctrine of ends. Section 3 discusses the concept of an end that is also a duty and why such ends are fundamental in a doctrine of virtue. Section 4 considers Kant’s argument that there must be ends that are also duties, otherwise (so he argues) there can be no doctrine of morals. The chapter’s conclusion is summary.

Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter considers whether political liberals can recognize exemptions from generally applicable laws when those laws substantially burden living in accordance with a religious comprehensive doctrine. It is argued that in some cases political liberals can recognize religious accommodations or exemptions. However, political liberals cannot single out religion, in particular, for special treatment; when other commitments function in the same way, those commitments should enjoy the same status as religious commitments. Nevertheless, it is claimed that political liberals cannot recognize exemptions or accommodations on any basis when a law is needed to secure and protect the equal standing of all persons as free and equal citizens.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-77
Author(s):  
Khafiz Kerimov

Abstract The first section of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals contains a teleological argument, the aim of which is to show that the natural purpose of human reason lies not in securing happiness but in morality. While the teleological argument is widely considered to be digressive and unconvincing in the secondary literature, in this article I attempt to show that the argument is neither digressive nor unconvincing. I argue that it fulfills an important synthetic task in the Groundwork (even if in a preliminary manner), that it is consistent with Kant’s views on natural teleology at the time, and that the criticism of happiness contained therein is as convincing as Kant’s criticism of happiness in the rest of the treatise.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-564
Author(s):  
Phillip Richter

The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be found in Aristotle or Descartes.


Author(s):  
Karif Jal Basara

The categorical imperative is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Introduced in Kant's 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it may be defined as a way of evaluating motivations for action.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document