Philosophical Background

This chapter provides a brief overview of certain elements of Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology that are essential background for understanding certain features of his ethical theory. In particular, it presents Kant’s distinction between the ‘world of sense’ or ‘phenomenal world’ and the ‘world of understanding’ or ‘noumenal world’ as a basis for explaining the limits of theoretical cognition which rules out theoretical cognition and knowledge of God, immortality of the soul, and freedom of the will, yet allows Kant to affirm their reality on moral grounds, needed to explain how the highest good is possible. Of importance for understanding certain claims in his work on virtue is the distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world as it applies to human beings. The chapter concludes with reflections on the relation between Kant’s ethics and his metaphysical and epistemological commitments.

General Ends that Are Also Duties

This chapter covers Sections IV through VIII of Kant’s dedicated introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue. Section 1 of this chapter explains that for Kant the two general ends that one has a duty to adopt are self-perfection and the happiness of others. It continues in section 2 explaining Kant’s clarification of these two concepts. The distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue is the focus of section 3. This includes a proposal for how to understand Kant’s dual distinction between narrow and wide obligation on one hand and perfect and imperfect obligation on the other. Section 4 takes up Kant’s “exposition” of the duties of self-perfection and the happiness of others. The chapter concludes with a brief summary.

The Vices of Hatred and of Disrespect

The vices of hatred—envy, ingratitude, and Schadenfreude—corresponding to the virtues of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participation are discussed in the first half of this chapter. Particular attention is paid to their psychological source. The second half of the chapter discusses duties of respect toward others that Kant explains are all negative: duties to avoid arrogance, backbiting, and derision. Attention is also paid to Kant’s views on contempt and whether they imply that all cases of holding someone in contempt are morally prohibited. The chapter also discusses Kant’s chapter on duties to others regarding their condition, where he briefly explains how differences in age, sex, and social rank of others can affect how the various duties of virtue, expressed as virtue rules, affect the application of those rules to particular circumstances.

Imperfect Duties to Oneself

This chapter covers both the imperfect duties of natural and moral self-perfection and the positive duties of conscience and moral self-scrutiny—these latter duties partly constitutive of the duty of moral self-perfection. Regarding the duty of conscience, the following questions are addressed: 1. What is conscience—its nature and role in moral life? 2. How is conscience experienced? 3. Can it be mistaken? 4. What are the duties of conscience and how are they justified? 5. What is the connection between conscience and blameworthiness? The duty of moral self-scrutiny foregrounds the moral importance of sincerity and impartiality in assessing one’s moral character. The chapter also explores the fundamental duty of moral self-perfection and Kant’s puzzling claim that it is both narrow and perfect yet also wide and imperfect. Also discussed are Kant’s views on the ethical treatment of animals, concluding with remarks on Kant’s moral teleology.

Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation

This chapter addresses the following topics pertaining to Section II of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals: 1. Kant’s conception of the faculty of desire and its relation to the faculties of feeling and cognition; 2. The significance of Kant’s distinction between will and choice in relation to human freedom of the will; 3. The distinction between maxims and imperatives as two fundamental types of practical principle; and 4. Kant’s conception of both nonmoral and moral motivation—the latter fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of virtue. The chapter establishes Kant’s background ideas on these ideas and faculties and also addresses aspects of his theory of action.

Friendship

This chapter considers “On the most intimate union of love and respect in friendship”—Kant’s conclusion to the preceding Elements of Ethics comprised of duties to oneself and to others. Kant first describes the elements of an ideal friendship which, as ideal, cannot be realized by human beings, yet it can serve as a standard for evaluating human friendships. He then proceeds to describe the elements of humanly possible “moral friendships” that strive toward a balance of love and respect, pointing out the difficulties in achieving them. This chapter elaborates on Kant’s behalf these types of friendship. It then proceeds to discuss Kant’s appendix on the virtues of social intercourse and their role in moral life.

Perfect Duties to Oneself as an Animal Being

This chapter considers the category of duties to oneself as an animal being: duties to avoid suicide and forms of self-mutilation, sexual self-abuse, and drunkenness and gluttony. Kant’s arguments for the claim that each of these types of action is morally wrong appeals to the “humanity formula” of his supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative). Importantly, the role of teleology in some of Kant’s arguments is discussed and a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ teleology is introduced. The chapter argues that while Kant mentions the natural purpose of one’s sexual powers in his argument against sexual self-abuse, his argument does not depend on it. However, as explained in later chapters, Kant’s ethics does rely on appeals to moral teleology, referring to the moral end of self-perfection.

Life and Work

This chapter is an introduction to Kant’s life and his work. It situates Kant’s moral philosophy historically, explains his writing of The Doctrine of Virtue (DV) and its place in Kant’s overall moral philosophy. The chapter concludes with an overview of the book’s five parts. Part I is background comprising two chapters. Part II explains the material in Kant’s general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, of which DV is a part. Part III covers the dedicated introduction to DV, while parts IV and V cover the doctrine of elements of ethics and the doctrine of method that comprise his normative ethical theory.

The Doctrine of Virtue as a Doctrine of Ends

This chapter concerns the first three sections of Kant’s dedicated introduction to Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals—The Doctrine of Virtue. Section 1 of the chapter explains why, according to Kant, there must be a doctrine of virtue as a part of a more comprehensive doctrine of morals. Section 2 explains why ethics is both a doctrine of virtue and a doctrine of ends. Section 3 discusses the concept of an end that is also a duty and why such ends are fundamental in a doctrine of virtue. Section 4 considers Kant’s argument that there must be ends that are also duties, otherwise (so he argues) there can be no doctrine of morals. The chapter’s conclusion is summary.

Perfect Duties to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being

This chapter considers Kant’s arguments for the claims that lying, miserliness, and servility are violations of duties to oneself. Although his argument against lying appeals to natural teleology, namely, that the purpose of one’s power of communication is to accurately convey one’s thoughts, this chapter argues that the argument is fallacious and that the wrongness of lying is better explained by relating it to the duties of conscience and self-scrutiny—duties partly constitutive of the duty of moral self-perfection. In addressing the duty to avoid miserliness, the chapter considers how Kant’s conception of virtue and vice contrasts with his understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. The chapter continues with the duty to avoid servility and its relation to Kant’s conception of ‘true noble pride’ to be found in the earlier lecture notes on ethics. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Kant’s so-called moral rigorism.