Stipulative Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-31
Author(s):  
Derek Lam
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Novel Theory

An agent’s knowledge of her own intentional actions (agential knowledge) is non-observational. Yet, intentional actions typically consist of happenings external to the agents. A theory is needed to explain how agents are warranted to form such beliefs independent of observation. This chapter first argues for three desirable features of an ideal theory about agential knowledge. After showing that no existing theories possess all three, a novel theory that does is presented. According to this theory, agential knowledge is the same kind of knowledge as the Kripkean contingent a priori: they are knowledge justified a priori by stipulation.

L'homme et la factrice: sur la logique du genre en français

Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-516
Author(s):  
Adèle Mercier
Keyword(s):  
Efficient Solution ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Feminist Criticism ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Job Titles ◽  
Pronominal System

ABSTRACTI present several arguments which provide what I consider to be a definitive argument against certain forms of masculine language in their so-called sexually neutral usage. In the first part, I concentrate on the use of the word “homme,” and I defend the idea that it embodies a perverse contingent a priori. In the second part, I examine how this pernicious a priori—this masculine language virus—infects the pronominal system of French. I conclude with an undoubtedly surprising linguistic and feminist criticism of a recent decision by the Office de la langue française du Québec to feminize job titles, arguing instead that the problem lies elsewhere and hence so does an efficient solution.

scholarly journals Naming and necessity in a two-dimensional semantic framework

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
János Kovács
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Causal Model ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Naming And Necessity

This paper surveys the relevance of Kripke’s semantics of proper names. In his Naming and Necessity Kripke takes issue with Frege’s and Russell’s descriptive semantics of proper names. He proposes a new model called the causal model of proper names. Kripke’s model of the philosophy of language have challenged the relation of the metaphysical concepts necessity/contingency and the epistemological concepts apriority/a posteriority, respectively. Since Kant it has been accepted that all a priori truth is necessary, while all a posteriori truth is contingent. Kripke’s book has changed these tenets and nowadays it is accepted that the four concepts are independent of each other and that the complex concepts generated with them have instance.   This paper investigates Kripke’s arguments on necessity and apriority in a two-dimensional semantic framework. The paper argues that the two-dimensional model is in harmony with Kripke’s model although Soames has been claiming the opposite in several publications. The paper claims that Soames’ theory of direct reference is unable to account for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements.

Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 481-489
Author(s):  
Peter Nicholls ◽  
Dan Passell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

scholarly journals Contingent A Priori Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Priori Knowledge

I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary

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