scholarly journals Naming and necessity in a two-dimensional semantic framework

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
János Kovács
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Causal Model ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Naming And Necessity

This paper surveys the relevance of Kripke’s semantics of proper names. In his Naming and Necessity Kripke takes issue with Frege’s and Russell’s descriptive semantics of proper names. He proposes a new model called the causal model of proper names. Kripke’s model of the philosophy of language have challenged the relation of the metaphysical concepts necessity/contingency and the epistemological concepts apriority/a posteriority, respectively. Since Kant it has been accepted that all a priori truth is necessary, while all a posteriori truth is contingent. Kripke’s book has changed these tenets and nowadays it is accepted that the four concepts are independent of each other and that the complex concepts generated with them have instance.   This paper investigates Kripke’s arguments on necessity and apriority in a two-dimensional semantic framework. The paper argues that the two-dimensional model is in harmony with Kripke’s model although Soames has been claiming the opposite in several publications. The paper claims that Soames’ theory of direct reference is unable to account for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements.

Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 481-489
Author(s):  
Peter Nicholls ◽  
Dan Passell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism

Philosophy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen K. McLeod
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Contingent Truth ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truth

AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

scholarly journals Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-55
Author(s):  
Dusko Prelevic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Modal Rationalism ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
Minimal Physicalism

Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Identity Statement ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-327
Author(s):  
Gregory W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truths

Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations.

scholarly journals LA TEORÍA DE LOS NOMBRES Y EL REALISMO METAFÍSICO

2013 ◽  
pp. 75-95
Author(s):  
Juan José Colomina Almiñana ◽  
Vicente Raga Rosaleny
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Naming And Necessity

En el presente escrito, los autores pretenden una nueva interpretación de las principales tesis de la más conocida obra de Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Se atiende a las nociones de a priori (y de necesidad) y a posteriori (y contingencia), la noción de designador rígido (con su explícita crítica a la teoría descriptivista fregeana de los nombres) y su revisión de los conceptos metafísicos de modalidad de dicto y modalidad de re. Más tarde, se definirá mínimamente la noción de realismo y se intentará situar a Kripke en el tipo que más cómodamente se adapte a sus presupuestos teóricos de carácter ordinario. Todo ello permitirá situar la teoría kripkeana de los nombres dentro de un marco realista que posibilitará, en otro momento ulterior, formular ciertas críticas a esta Teoría Causal de la Referencia y al realismo metafísico a ella asociada.

scholarly journals Subgrid modelling for two-dimensional turbulence using neural networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 858 ◽  
pp. 122-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Maulik ◽  
O. San ◽  
A. Rasheed ◽  
P. Vedula
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Numerical Data ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Optimization Analysis ◽  
Turbulence Closures ◽  
Flow Evolution ◽  
Promising Development

In this investigation, a data-driven turbulence closure framework is introduced and deployed for the subgrid modelling of Kraichnan turbulence. The novelty of the proposed method lies in the fact that snapshots from high-fidelity numerical data are used to inform artificial neural networks for predicting the turbulence source term through localized grid-resolved information. In particular, our proposed methodology successfully establishes a map between inputs given by stencils of the vorticity and the streamfunction along with information from two well-known eddy-viscosity kernels. Through this we predict the subgrid vorticity forcing in a temporally and spatially dynamic fashion. Our study is botha priorianda posterioriin nature. In the former, we present an extensive hyper-parameter optimization analysis in addition to learning quantification through probability-density-function-based validation of subgrid predictions. In the latter, we analyse the performance of our framework for flow evolution in a classical decaying two-dimensional turbulence test case in the presence of errors related to temporal and spatial discretization. Statistical assessments in the form of angle-averaged kinetic energy spectra demonstrate the promise of the proposed methodology for subgrid quantity inference. In addition, it is also observed that some measure ofa posteriorierror must be considered during optimal model selection for greater accuracy. The results in this article thus represent a promising development in the formalization of a framework for generation of heuristic-free turbulence closures from data.

Kripke’s sole route to the necessary a posteriori

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 388-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Eaker
Keyword(s):  
A Posteriori ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Scott Soames ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke’s second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames’ misinterpretation.

scholarly journals A Interpretação Epistêmica da Semântica Bidimensional

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-143
Author(s):  
Júlia Telles Menezes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Linguistic Terms ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional. AbstractThis paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario.

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