PC Problems

2021 ◽  
pp. 30-50
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti

This chapter provides grounds for thinking that PC is insufficient even as a theory of non-inferential justification. Two primary problems are raised for PC. First, PC needs an account of epistemic defeat. PC includes a “no-defeater” condition. However, it is shown that once one tries to get clear on the nature of defeat and how defeaters work within the framework of PC, it becomes apparent that one needs to appeal to something more than just the comparative strength of various seemings. Second, it is argued that PC falls prey to the problem of reflective awareness. If one reflects on one’s seemings, one’s justification deriving solely from them is destroyed. So, it seems that satisfying some condition other than PC is required for reflective agents to have stable non-inferential justification. It is also shown, however, that an unexpected consequence of the problem of reflective awareness is that PC is not really subject to bootstrapping problems.

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti

AbstractPhenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most developed view to this effect is Michael Huemer ’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Luca Moretti has recently shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.


Author(s):  
Robert Boncardo

This concluding chapter first presents a reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s book The Number and the Siren, which aims to overcome the limitations of Rancière’s interpretation of Mallarmé by showing how the poet succeeded in creating a secular Eucharist. The chapter argues, however, that Meillassoux’s book has the unexpected consequence of showing the gap between Mallarmé’s poetry and its alleged political ambitions. It closes with a call for renewed thinking on the link between literature and politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 2635
Author(s):  
Marli Gonan Božac ◽  
Katarina Kostelić ◽  
Morena Paulišić ◽  
Charles G. Smith

The aim of this research was to examine partial reflective awareness in ethical business choices in Croatia. The ethical decision-making is interlinked with sustainable practices, but it is also its prerequisite. Thus, better understanding of business ethics decision-making provides a basis for designing and implementing sustainability in a corporate setting. The research was done on student populations who will soon carry important roles and make important decisions for individuals, organizations, and society. The field research was conducted using Kohlberg’s scenarios. The results reveal that the process of decision-making goes through the lenses of respondents’ own preferred ethics. However, the reflective awareness of respondents’ preferred ethics is skewed and regularities in that deviations point out to the relevance of the context characteristics and arousal factors. In addition, the individuals do not use all available information in the assessment process. The revealed partial reflective awareness contributes to explanation of why people have problems with justifying their choices. As there are many examples of unethical behavior in the environment that remain unpunished, it is necessary to raise awareness of the issue. Improvement in reflective awareness would contribute to more sustainable ethical choices and reveal a possibility of an intervention design within the higher education framework.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 147-169
Author(s):  
Taner Edis ◽  
Maarten Boudry

AbstractJudgments of the rationality of beliefs must take the costs of acquiring and possessing beliefs into consideration. In that case, certain false beliefs, especially those that are associated with the benefits of a cohesive community, can be seen to be useful for an agent and perhaps instrumentally rational to hold. A distinction should be made between excusable misbeliefs, which a rational agent should tolerate, and misbeliefs that are defensible in their own right because they confer benefits on the agent. Likely candidates for such misbeliefs are to be found in the realm of nationalism and religion, where the possession costs of true beliefs are high, and where collective beliefs in falsehoods may allow for a cohesive community. We discuss the paradoxes of reflective awareness involved in the idea of deliberately embracing falsehoods. More rigorous, fully reflective concepts of rationality would still disallow false beliefs, but such demanding versions of rationality would commit agents to pay large costs, thereby weakening the motivation for acquiring true beliefs.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.


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