Inference without Regress

A central obstacle for an account of inference is to show how it is possible to satisfy the Taking Condition without engendering a vicious regress. This is the lesson of Carroll’s Paradox. The basic difficulty is this: whatever knowledge one employs in judging that the premises support the conclusion would seem itself to be part of what supports the conclusion, thus requiring a further piece of knowledge. I argue that inferring is a matter of understanding the relevant propositions well enough to recognize that it is impossible for premises that one accepts to be true and the conclusion to be false, so that one sees the conclusion as what must be true, thereby believing it. Nothing more is required for inference than the proper understanding of premises and conclusion.

Voluntarism, Naturalism, and Moral Realism

Pufendorf criticizes Hobbes from a voluntarist point of view. He argues that if there were no divine commands, Hobbes would be right to derive morality from self-interest. Divine commands introduce the element of morality that goes beyond self-interest. Suarez is wrong, therefore, to believe in objective morality without divine commands. Shaftesbury attacks both egoists and voluntarists as ‘nominal moralists’ who overlook the objective reality of moral rightness and wrongness. Cudworth defends this position, arguing that any attempt to derive genuine morality from commands leads to a vicious regress. Clarke argues, from a position similar to Cudworth’s, that Hobbes cannot consistently maintain his view that nothing is morally right or wrong without enforcement by an organized state.

Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations

A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid view is operative in Husserl’s analyses of essentially occasional expressions and categorial intuition. And I argue that is also deployed in relation to Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of perceptual fullness, which allows it to avoid an objection raised by Walter Hopp – that the combination of Husserl’s analysis of perceptual fullness with conceptualism about perceptual content generates a vicious regress.

Substance

One of Spinoza’s most surprising claims about substance is that it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. What does this mean and why does Spinoza’ believe it? This chapter begins by situating Spinoza’s concept of substance in historical context by explaining the Aristotelian and Cartesian concepts of substance. Next, Spinoza’s argument for the claim that it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist is reconstructed and discussed step by step. Particular attention is paid to the connection that Spinoza sees between causation and similarity: one thing causes another only if they are similar to each other (that is, they share an attribute). Other issues considered in detail include Spinoza’s claim that no two substances can share an attribute and whether a world devoid of substance would involve a vicious regress with respect to being.

Universals

In metaphysics, the term ‘universals’ is applied to things of two sorts: properties (such as redness or roundness), and relations (such as kinship relations like sisterhood, or the causal relation, or spatial and temporal relations). Universals are to be understood by contrast with particulars. Few universals, if any, are truly ‘universal’ in the sense that they are shared by all individuals – a universal is characteristically the sort of thing which some individuals may have in common, and others may lack. Universals have been conceived to be things which enable us intellectually to grasp a permanent, underlying order behind the changing flux of experience. Some of the gods of ancient mythologies correspond roughly to various important underlying universals – social relations for instance, as for example if Hera is said to be the goddess of Marriage and Ares (or Mars) is said to be the god of War. Many traditions, East and West, have dealt with the underlying problem which generates theories of universals; nevertheless the term ‘universals’ is closely tied to the Western tradition, and the agenda has been set largely by the work of Plato and Aristotle. The term often used in connection with Plato is not ‘universals’ but ‘Forms’ (or ‘Ideas’, used in the sense of ideals rather than of thoughts), the term ‘universals’ echoing Aristotle more than Plato. Other terms cognate with universals include not only properties and relations, but also qualities, attributes, characteristics, essences and accidents (in the sense of qualities which a thing has not of necessity but only by accident), species and genus, and natural kinds. Various arguments have been advanced to establish the existence of universals, the most memorable of which is the ‘one over many’ argument. There are also various arguments against the existence of universals. There are, for instance, various vicious regress arguments which derive from Aristotle’s so-called ‘third man argument’ against Plato. Another family of arguments trades on what is called Ockham’s razor: it is argued that we can say anything we need to say, and explain everything we need to explain, without appeal to universals; and if we can, and if we are rational, then we should. Those who believe in universals are called Realists, those who do not are called Nominalists.

Manifestations

Manifestations are events which are effects of dispositions being activated. Events often involve something acquiring a property. According to dispositional monism or pandispositionalism, all properties are dispositions. If all properties were dispositions, then all manifestations would involve something acquiring a disposition. Whether this leads to a vicious regress is unclear. However, pandispositionalism may render nearly all properties unobservable. Another issue about manifestations involves the question of whether dispositions are all single-track or whether some of them are multi-track. Some philosophers argue that each type of disposition has one type of manifestation. However, the events that occur when a disposition manifests vary according to the circumstances. This motivates some philosophers to say that manifestations are not effects but are instead contributions to effects. But it is not clear what kind of entity a contribution is, or if it is needed. Consequently, dispositions are extremely numerous or massively multi-track.

A Relation ‘that relates itself to itself’, Some Regress Threats, and a Mystery

Brentano’s metaphysics of consciousness faces several questions: Can a relation be self-relating without leading to counter-intuitive consequences? Has the vicious regress of conscious-making acts really been stopped by Brentano’s theory or is there a revenge regress? In this chapter I answer these questions on Brentano’s behalf. I will assess Gurwitsch’s argument against Brentano and argue that it shows that one of Gurwitsch’s premises is wrong, not that there is a new regress for Brentano. Pothast also does not show that there is a regress threat for Brentano because Brentano does not, as Pothast claims, hold that the secondary presentation presents itself as a presentation of itself. A similar criticism applies to Frank’s attempt to show that Brentano is open to a regress threat. The chapter concludes by investigating what distinguishes conscious and unconscious mental acts, and why and how self-referentiality makes for consciousness.

WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.