Principles of Inferential Justification

Author(s):  
Trent Dougherty
Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.


Author(s):  
Trivellore E. Raghunathan

Demand for access to data, especially data collected using public funds, is ever growing. At the same time, concerns about the disclosure of the identities of and sensitive information about the respondents providing the data are making the data collectors limit the access to data. Synthetic data sets, generated to emulate certain key information found in the actual data and provide the ability to draw valid statistical inferences, are an attractive framework to afford widespread access to data for analysis while mitigating privacy and confidentiality concerns. The goal of this article is to provide a review of various approaches for generating and analyzing synthetic data sets, inferential justification, limitations of the approaches, and directions for future research. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Statistics, Volume 8 is March 8, 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.


1976 ◽  
Vol 73 (17) ◽  
pp. 570
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. e42186
Author(s):  
Berit Brogaard

The evidential role of experience in justifying beliefs has been at the center of debate in philosophy in recent years. One view is that experience, or seeming, can confer immediate (defeasible) justification on belief in virtue of its representational phenomenology. Call this view “representational dogmatism.” Another view is that experience confers immediate justification on belief in virtue of its relational phenomenology. Call this view “relational dogmatism.” The goal of this paper is to pit these two versions of dogmatism against each other in terms of their ability to account for ampliative, or non-deductive, inferential justification. I will argue that only the representational view can provide a plausible account of this type of justification.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-165
Author(s):  
Tommaso Piazza

AbstractEvidentialism says that a subject S’s justification is entirely determined by S’s evidence. The plausibility of evidentialism depends on (1) what kind of entities constitute a subject S’s evidence and (2) what one takes the support relation to consist in. Conee and Feldman’s mainstream evidentialism (ME) incorporates a psychologist answer to (1) and an explanationist answer to (2). ME naturally accommodates perceptual justification. However, it does not accommodate intuitive cases of inferential justification. In the second part of the paper, I consider and reject a reply based on a refined explanationist theory of the support relation proposed by K McCain.


1976 ◽  
Vol 73 (17) ◽  
pp. 557 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Fumerton

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