Selling Environmental Indulgences

Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin

According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots. The problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are on average enjoying too high a standard of living. All that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives facing agents as they pursue their various goals. For some things, people must pay full price. For others, they pay only partially or indirectly or belatedly. To an economist, it goes without saying that the lower the costs, the more people will consume of any particular commodity. Where some of the costs of their activities will be borne by others, agents looking only to their own balance sheets will overengage in those activities. Because some of the costs are “external” (which is to say, are borne by others, rather than themselves), agents will undertake more of those activities than they would have done had they been forced to pay their full costs. They will do more of them than is socially optimal, taking due account of costs and benefits to everyone concerned (Pigou 1932). Environmental despoliation poses problems of economic externalities of just that sort. Environmental inputs are typically “common property resources.” Clean air and water, fisheries, the ozone layer, the climate are everyone’s business—and no one’s. No one “owns” those things. There is no one with standing to sue you if you take them without paying; nor is there anyone you could pay for permission to impinge on them, even if you wanted to do so. That fact inevitably gives rise to a divergence between the full social costs created by your actions and the portion of those costs sheeted back to you as private costs, to be entered on your own ledger. It is, of course, only the latter sorts of costs to which economically rational agents can be expected to respond (Freeman et al. 1973; Fisher 1981; Pearce et al. 1989, esp. p. 5).

Social Change ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 110-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. K. Sinha ◽  
H. C. Pokhriyal

In the whole debate of ecological suitability of Tehri Dam, the rehabilitation aspect has been found ignored. Keeping in view of the significance of complete rehabilitation and resettlement of the oustees, the overall rehabilitation process including rural and urban population is analysed in the present paper. In total, 125 villages will be fully or partially submerged affecting more than one lakh population. More than twenty thousand urban populations will also be rehabilitated. It is expected that around 6000 cores of rupees (at 1993 price level) will be spent. Out of which 13% will be spent on the rehabilitation of the oustees. On the basis of the available information, it is found that only 33% of the rural families and 66% of the urban households have actually received the compensation or taken the possession of the land in the new sites. Non availability of land to the rest of the oustee households has been identified as the peculiar dimension of the rehabilitation process. The resettled households in Dehradun and Haridwar districts are facing the problem of geographic continuity, land owner shiprights and absence of institutional mechanism like panchayati raj institutions in the new settlements. The absence of non-farm employment and non-accessibility to the common property resources are the critical problems, including the availability of drinking water, irrigation, primary health and education, which can be observed seen in the rehabilitation sites. The resettlers are unable to adjust with the new environment including a high level of dependency on the market forces for each and every requirement. The partially submerged population is also facing peculiar problems. They will only be given cash compensation without any other compensatory measures. The ‘upstream cost and down stream benefits syndrome’ is strikingly visible in the rehabilitation process. In the urban resettlement process various issues Iike-the validity of survey, classification of urban households and cut off dates are relevant to mention. The positive externalities of the old Tehri town were completely missing in the new urban rehabilitation site. As a whole it can be tentatively said that the process of rehabilitation has been loosely coordinated and badly implemented. The issues of upstream cost, accessibility to common property resources and customary rights are the neglected aspects in the process. The re-organisation of the institutional frame work and granting land ownership rights to the resettlers and quality of the basic amenities are the other inevitable requirements need proper assessment and implementation. The present process of rehabilitation is largely non-participatory and non transparent, which can only be solved through radical measures. These measures are unlikely to be initiated in the present set of Tehri dam administration.


1970 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 31-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laya Prasad Uprety

This is an overview paper based on the contemporary literature available in the regime of forest and pasture as common property resources. The analysis has underscored the role of local institutions and organizations for the sustainable management of forest and pasture as common property resources. The paper concludes that farmers of Nepal have developed and used the organizational and institutional mechanisms for the sustained management of these resources by ensuring social equity. Understanding the ingredients of indigenous resource management systems can have a bearing on developing appropriate national policies aiming at ensuring the sustainability of the future programs of Nepal.Key Words: Institution, organization, indigenous, traditional, common property, sustainable, social equity, participation, etc.DOI = 10.3126/dsaj.v2i0.1357Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol.2 pp.31-64


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