Category Theory and Foundations

Author(s):  
Michael Ernst

In the foundations of mathematics there has been an ongoing debate about whether categorical foundations can replace set-theoretical foundations. The primary goal of this chapter is to provide a condensed summary of that debate. It addresses the two primary points of contention: technical adequacy and autonomy. Finally, it calls attention to a neglected feature of the debate, the claim that categorical foundations are more natural and readily useable, and how deeper investigation of that claim could prove fruitful for our understanding of mathematical thinking and mathematical practice.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-159
Author(s):  
Charmaine Mangram ◽  
Kathy Liu Sun

The pervasiveness of digital technology creates an imperative for mathematics teacher educators to prepare preservice teachers (PSTs) to select technology to support students’ mathematical development. We report on research conducted on an assignment created for and implemented in secondary mathematics methods courses requiring PSTs to select and evaluate digital mathematics tools. We found that PSTs primarily focused on pedagogical fidelity (ease of use), did not consider mathematical fidelity (accuracy), and at times superficially attended to cognitive fidelity (how well the tool reflects students’ mathematical thinking processes) operationalized as the CCSS for Mathematical Practice and Five Strands of Mathematical Proficiency. We discuss implications for implementing the assignment and suggestions for addressing PSTs’ challenges with identifying the mathematical practices and five strands.


Author(s):  
Colin McLarty

Since the 1960s Lawvere has distinguished two senses of the foundations of mathematics. Logical foundations use formal axioms to organize the subject. The other sense aims to survey ‘what is universal in mathematics’. The ontology of mathematics is a third, related issue. Moderately categorical foundations use sets as axiomatized by the elementary theory of the category of sets (ETCS) rather than Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF). This claims to make set theory conceptually more like the rest of mathematics than ZF is. And it suggests that sets are not ‘made of’ anything determinate; they only have determinate functional relations to one another. The ZF and ETCS axioms both support classical mathematics. Other categories have also been offered as logical foundations. The ‘category of categories’ takes categories and functors as fundamental. The ‘free topos’ (see Lambek and Couture 1991) stresses provability. These and others are certainly formally adequate. The question is how far they illuminate the most universal aspects of current mathematics. Radically categorical foundations say mathematics has no one starting point; each mathematical structure exists in its own right and can be described intrinsically. The most flexible way to do this to date is categorically. From this point of view various structures have their own logic. Sets have classical logic, or rather the topos Set has classical logic. But differential manifolds, for instance, fit neatly into a topos Spaces with nonclassical logic. This view urges a broader practice of mathematics than classical. This article assumes knowledge of category theory on the level of Category theory, introduction to §1.


2000 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 4018-4031
Author(s):  
V. K. Zakharov ◽  
A. V. Mikhalev

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN-PIERRE MARQUIS

AbstractFeferman’s argument presented in 1977 seemed to block any possibility for category theory to become a serious contender in the foundational game. According to Feferman, two obstacles stand in the way: one logical and the other psychological. We address both obstacles in this paper, arguing that although Feferman’s argument is indeed convincing in a certain context, it can be dissolved entirely by modifying the context appropriately.


1991 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan L. Richards

The ArgumentIt has long been apparent that in the nineteenth century, mathematics in France and England developed along different lines. The differences, which might well be labelled stylistic, are most easy to see on the foundational level. At first this may seem surprising because it is such a fundamental area, but, upon reflection, it is to be expected. Ultimately discussions about the foundations of mathematics turn on views about what mathematics is, and this is a question which is answered by a variety of different groups including mathematicians, students, curricular planners, parents, etc. Mathematical practice rests on some kind of mixture of the answers to this fundamental question which come from these diverse groups. Comparing the cultural matrices which supported mathematics in France and Britain in the first decades of the nineteenth century sheds light on the real though often subtle differences in the ways the subject was pursued in the two countries.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HELLMAN

AbstractFirst we review highlights of the ongoing debate about foundations of category theory, beginning with Feferman’s important article of 1977, then moving to our own paper of 2003, contrasting replies by McLarty and Awodey, and our own rejoinders to them. Then we offer a modest proposal for reformulating a theory of category of categories that would actually meet the objections of Feferman and Hellman and provide a genuine alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. This proposal is more modest than that of our (2003) in omitting modal logic and in permitting a more “top-down” approach, where particular categories and functors need not be explicitly defined. Possible reasons for resisting the proposal are offered and countered. The upshot is to sustain a pluralism of foundations along lines actually foreseen by Feferman (1977), something that should be welcomed as a way of resolving this long-standing debate.


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