Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?
This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate TMV, elements of which can be found in the work of Kalderon (2011) and Brewer (2011). The central tenant of TMV is the claim that one’s reason for one’s perceptual belief should, in all cases, be identified with some item one perceives which makes the proposition believed true. I defend an argument against TMV which appeals to (a) the claim that the reason for which one believes should always to be identified with the explanans of the rationalizing explanation to which one’s belief is subject and (b) the claim that the explanantia of rationalizing explanations must be identified with truths. I finish by replying to two objections to the argument.