Kit Fine. Model theory for modal logic. Part I—the de re/de dicto distinction. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 7 (1978), pp. 125–156. - Kit Fine. Model theory for modal logic—part II. The elimination of de re modality. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 7 (1978), pp. 277–306. - Kit Fine. Model theory for modal logic—part III. Existence and predication. Journal of philosophical logic, vol. 10 (1981), pp. 293–307.

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1083-1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul A. Kripke
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Kit Fine ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
De Dicto

The Problem of de re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-246
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument ◽  
De Dicto

The problem of de re modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality de dicto is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a “logical” and a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another.

The Problem of De Re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument

Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a ‘logical’ argument and a ‘metaphysical’ argument. That the ‘logical’ argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. This chapter claims that this ‘logical argument’ is his basic argument. However, Kit Fine disagrees. It is conceded that Fine is correct that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. However, the most important question for the purposes of this chapter is whether Fine is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another; that the metaphysical argument raises a separate and independent objection to the intelligibility of quantifying into modal contents. This chapter suggests not.

Modal Types

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-138
Author(s):  
David Corfield
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Modal Logic ◽  
Temporal Logic ◽  
Homotopy Type ◽  
Type Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
De Re ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Homotopy Type Theory ◽  
De Dicto

Modal logic flourished throughout the twentieth century. Kripke provided a semantics in terms of possible world recognized by mathematicians to be an example of varying sets. This allows a formulation in terms of monads generated by adjunctions. Modal homotopy type theory adds the radical idea that modalities apply to all types, not just propositions, so as to make sense of possible steps and necessary ingredients. The proximity is shown between the structures discovered by modal logicians and common ideas in mathematics of stability under variation. We can then reformulate many ideas in current philosophical metaphysical uses of modal logic, such as rigid designators, counterparts, the de re/de dicto distinction, and so on. Worlds are understood as extended contexts, allowing a formulation of counterfactuals. A form of temporal logic is also easily generated in the same vein.

Necessary Properties And Linnaean Essentialism

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berent Enç
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
De Dicto

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable.

Epistemic logic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Hintikka ◽  
Ilpo Halonen
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Deductive System ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modern Treatment ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge

Modern treatment of epistemic logic began in the 1950s when some philosophers noticed (as scholastics had done before them) certain regularities in the logical behaviour of the concept of knowledge (for example, that knowing a conjunction is equivalent to knowing all its conjuncts) and began to systematize them. Initially these regularities were presented in the form of an axiomatic-deductive system, as in other branches of logic. Later, questions began to be asked concerning the model theory on which such an ‘epistemic logic’ is based. Still later, the concrete interpretation of this model theory has become an issue. In this way, gradually a bridge has begun to be forged from purely logical questions to such central epistemological questions as those concerning the objects of knowledge, different kinds (or even senses) of knowledge (and their interrelations), the intensional character of knowledge, the de dicto versus de re distinction, and so on.

scholarly journals The New Aristotelian Essentialists

Metaphysica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold W. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Kit Fine ◽  
Quantified Modal Logic ◽  
De Re ◽  
Seminal Work

AbstractIn recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists regard essence as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions.

scholarly journals Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-313
Author(s):  
Tomasz Jarmużek ◽  
Krzysztof Krawczyk ◽  
Rafał Palczewski
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
De Dicto

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

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