Fifty Years of Financial Regulation in Germany

2021 ◽  
pp. 101-120
Author(s):  
Christoph Kaserer

This chapter gives an overview on how financial market regulation evolved in Germany since the 1970s. The picture presented is somehow contradicting, as it seems that banking regulation and capital market regulation evolved in a quite different way. As far as banking regulation is concerned, it will be shown that starting with the Herstatt crisis in 1974 there was a clear trend towards tightening and increasing the regulatory perimeter. By analysing how the budget of the German banking supervision authority evolved since 1988, this claim will also be corroborated empirically. The picture with respect to capital market regulation is quite different, however. Here, the regulatory process started back in the year 1990 and, at least for the first decade, it was focused towards liberalizing and modernizing the German capital market. It will be argued that there is an underlying public choice mechanism able to explain this different development in two adjacent areas of financial market regulation.

2012 ◽  
Vol 02 (11) ◽  
pp. 15-24
Author(s):  
Charles Kombo Okioga

Capital Market Authority in Kenya is in a development phase in order to be effective in the regulation of the financial markets. The market participants and the regulators are increasingly adopting international standards in order to make the capital markets in sync with those of developed markets. New products are being introduced and new business lines are being established. The Capital Markets Authority (Regulator) is constantly reviewing existing regulations and recommending changes to regulate the market properly. Business lines and activities are being harmonized by market participants to provide a one stop solution in order to meet the financial and securities services needs of the investors. The convergence of business lines and activities of market intermediaries gives rise to the diversity of a firm’s business operations to meet multiplicity of regulations that its activities are subject to. The methodology used in this study was designed to examine the relationship between capital markets Authority effective regulation and the performance of the financial markets. The study used correlation design, the study population consisted of 30 employees in financial institutions regulated by Capital Markets Authority and 80 investors. The study found out that effective financial market regulation has a significant relationship with the financial market performance indicated by (r=0.571, p<0.01) and (r=0.716, p≤0.01, the study recommended a further research on the factors that hinder effective financial regulation by the Capital Markets Authority.


2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Susan D. Krische ◽  
Nancy R. Mangold ◽  
Stephen G. Ryan

SYNOPSIS A concurrent session at the 2011 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting featured the panel discussion “Financial Market Regulation and Opportunities for Accounting Research.” Structuring their comments around their unique interests and expertise, the panelists covered diverse topics on the regulation of financial markets and financial institutions, including current activities of the primary financial market regulators responsible for accounting and auditing oversight, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the financial regulation of financial institutions from an economist's perspective. This paper summarizes the panelists' prepared remarks, which were followed by questions and comments from the audience.


Author(s):  
Richard Deeg ◽  
Walter James

The regulation of finance is central to the growth and development of every economy. Financial regulation determines the overall character of the financial system, the relationship between borrowers and savers, the allocation of capital, and the macroeconomic performance of the economy. Financial market regulation is distinct from regulation of other sectors of the economy because of the essential infrastructural role of finance—all other sectors of advanced economies depend on the financial system. Despite its enormous importance, financial regulation normally has low political salience. Except in times of crisis, most voters—and therefore politicians—have relatively little interest in the matter. This can be attributed in part to the complex and technical nature of financial markets and regulation, which relatively few people understand well. Low political salience facilitates a regulatory process that is very heavily shaped by regulators (technocrats) and the industry they regulate, with only minor direction from elected political leaders. In the long history of capitalism, bank and financial system crises have been regular occurrences. Regulation, or regulatory failure, is often seen as a cause of crises, but regulatory change is also the response. Thus any given financial regulatory regime is never settled for long. After the Great Depression, advanced capitalist economies introduced highly restrictive financial regulatory regimes designed to minimize systemic risk from bank failures. In the postwar period, restrictive regulatory regimes were combined with capital controls that limited international movements of capital. The postwar Bretton Woods international monetary regime stabilized fixed exchange rates through such controls and, when necessary, lending by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to countries that could not pay for their external debts. Starting with the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the early 1970s, all the advanced economies started liberalizing financial market regulation and removing capital controls as part of a broader shift toward a neoliberal economic philosophy. These deregulatory measures brought about a dramatic transformation of domestic financial systems and the reemergence of a dynamic and rapidly growing international financial market. Such dynamic and internationalized financial market was, in large part, the root cause of the early-21st-century financial crisis. The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 precipitated widespread review and revision of financial market regulations at both the domestic and international levels. These revisions include a shift from private self-regulation to state-driven regulation of financial markets, the centralization of regulation at the level of the European Union, and a closer cooperation between states in forging international regulatory standards. Nonetheless, despite the dramatic growth of the international financial market and transnational efforts to coordinate regulation, financial regulation remains overwhelmingly a domestic affair.


Author(s):  
Michael Abendschein ◽  
Harry Gölz

AbstractAt the latest the global financial crisis has raised the awareness of the need for a globally coordinated financial market regulation. Even though the necessity to cooperate is widely acknowledged, cooperation is often limited in practice. This article characterizes the formation of self-enforcing international financial regulation agreements. Our analysis allows to evaluate the desirability and feasibility of cooperative solutions and explains the challenges associated with the process of cooperation. We model the cooperation of national financial regulators in a game-theoretical framework that considers financial stability to be an impure public good. Joint national supervisory effort is supposed to increase aggregate welfare in terms of a more stable financial system both on a global and on a local level by simultaneously generating incentives to free-ride. Our analysis in general indicates the difficulty of reaching a fully cooperative solution. In our basic version of the model we show that partial cooperation of two or three countries is stable and improves the welfare of all countries relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Further analyses highlight the role of additional club benefits. When signatory countries of a coalition gain benefits over and above the joint welfare maximization, stable coalitions of any size become feasible.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
Otabek Narziev

This paper provides the necessary information and analysis for understanding and considering the main research questions and discussions of the research. Notably, this section outlines the background to capital market formation and development in CIS countries through a brief history of the CIS; considers the necessity of capital market and its regulation in CIS countries; reviews the institutional and legal framework of capital market regulation, and analyzes certain problems of capital market development.


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