The Practical Thinking View

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-84
Author(s):  
Tamar Schapiro
Keyword(s):  
Brute Force

In this chapter, I consider a very common reaction against an imagined brute force view. The “practical thinking” view holds that when you are inclined to act, you are not simply being pushed around. Rather, you are engaged in some kind of practical thinking, the same kind of practical thinking through which you move yourself when you are acting. I do not reject the practical thinking view as such. But I argue that most versions of it make being inclined to act too much like acting. The problem is not the idea that inclinations are guided by practical thinking, but rather the further idea that this thinking is attributable to us in the same sense that our actions are. I call this assumption “motivational monism.” I claim that the practical thinking view can only succeed if it rejects motivational monism.

The Brute Force View

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Tamar Schapiro
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
Intuitive Appeal ◽  
The Way

In this chapter, I consider a conception of inclination that haunts the theory of action. It is alluded to in metaphors, but it is almost never defended systematically. This “brute force view” holds that our relation to our inclinations is analogous to our relation to external, brute forces. The intuitive appeal of this view is that it seems to capture two features of the way our inclinations influence us: they exert asymmetric pressure on us, and they are non-voluntary. But it does not capture a third feature, namely the deliberative role inclinations play. I claim further that upon closer inspection, the brute force view does not, in fact, adequately capture the first two features. The reason is that the brute force view makes inclinations external to us, in the wrong way. It makes being inclined to φ‎ too unlike φ‎-ing.

The High Road

2021 ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
Tamar Schapiro
Keyword(s):  
Raw Material ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
The Difference ◽  
High Road

In this chapter, I begin to show how the inner animal view meets the constraints I laid out. What is the relation between your instinctive part and your deciding part? It cannot be that of rider to horse, because that would be an internalized brute force view. I argue further that it cannot be that of ruler to citizenry, as in Korsgaard’s constitution model of the soul, because that makes the difference between inclination and will too shallow. Instead of looking for familiar analogies, I claim, we should accept that this relation is sui generis, while still articulating a conception that meets the three constraints. Here I focus on non-voluntariness and deliberative role. I explain why it is challenging to meet these constraints jointly. I then show how the inner animal view can be developed so as to meet both. Your inclinations are non-voluntary because they are guided by your instinctive mind, which is different from your deciding mind. They can nevertheless play a deliberative role, because you can take your inner animal’s thinking as raw material and “incorporate” it into a maxim that you can regard as worthy of your choice.

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