The Brute Force View

In this chapter, I consider a conception of inclination that haunts the theory of action. It is alluded to in metaphors, but it is almost never defended systematically. This “brute force view” holds that our relation to our inclinations is analogous to our relation to external, brute forces. The intuitive appeal of this view is that it seems to capture two features of the way our inclinations influence us: they exert asymmetric pressure on us, and they are non-voluntary. But it does not capture a third feature, namely the deliberative role inclinations play. I claim further that upon closer inspection, the brute force view does not, in fact, adequately capture the first two features. The reason is that the brute force view makes inclinations external to us, in the wrong way. It makes being inclined to φ‎ too unlike φ‎-ing.

Introduction

This book grew out of ethical concerns. I was wondering, in a general way, how feelings fit into a good life. How, ideally, should we relate to our feelings, in the course of leading our lives? The rationalist tendency is to see feelings as influences that cloud our better judgment and lead us to betray our principles. The romantic tendency is to see them as expressions of our wisest, most authentic selves. Now, this might be a false dichotomy. But even if it is, what sort of argument could justify that conclusion?...

Framing the Question

In this chapter, I frame my question. My explicandum is the moment in which you are inclined, but not thereby determined, to φ‎. I call this “the moment of drama.” I want to know what challenges and opportunities we are faced with, in this moment. My question arises out of a distinctive philosophical method, one that differs from the standard method in philosophy of mind and action. The standard method asks, “what happens when someone acts?” My method, which is inspired by Kant, asks, “what am I doing, insofar as I am acting?” I explain how this method leads me to take the moment of drama as my explicandum. Finally, I preview three features of the relation between inclination and will that characterize this moment: being inclined to φ‎ is a non-voluntary condition that exerts asymmetric pressure on the will, while also playing a deliberative role.

The Practical Thinking View

In this chapter, I consider a very common reaction against an imagined brute force view. The “practical thinking” view holds that when you are inclined to act, you are not simply being pushed around. Rather, you are engaged in some kind of practical thinking, the same kind of practical thinking through which you move yourself when you are acting. I do not reject the practical thinking view as such. But I argue that most versions of it make being inclined to act too much like acting. The problem is not the idea that inclinations are guided by practical thinking, but rather the further idea that this thinking is attributable to us in the same sense that our actions are. I call this assumption “motivational monism.” I claim that the practical thinking view can only succeed if it rejects motivational monism.

The High Road

In this chapter, I begin to show how the inner animal view meets the constraints I laid out. What is the relation between your instinctive part and your deciding part? It cannot be that of rider to horse, because that would be an internalized brute force view. I argue further that it cannot be that of ruler to citizenry, as in Korsgaard’s constitution model of the soul, because that makes the difference between inclination and will too shallow. Instead of looking for familiar analogies, I claim, we should accept that this relation is sui generis, while still articulating a conception that meets the three constraints. Here I focus on non-voluntariness and deliberative role. I explain why it is challenging to meet these constraints jointly. I then show how the inner animal view can be developed so as to meet both. Your inclinations are non-voluntary because they are guided by your instinctive mind, which is different from your deciding mind. They can nevertheless play a deliberative role, because you can take your inner animal’s thinking as raw material and “incorporate” it into a maxim that you can regard as worthy of your choice.

The Inner Animal View

In this chapter, I put forward the core of my “inner animal” view. When you are inclined but not determined to φ‎, you are relating to a part of yourself that has already determined itself to φ‎. This part of you as the structure of a creature of instinct. I find a suggestion of this view in Kant’s idea that what necessitates the arbitrium brutum merely affects the arbitrium sensitivum liberum. I develop the idea by relying on Korsgaard’s conception of animal agency. When you are in the moment of drama, I claim, part of you is already active, under the guidance of the instinctive part of your mind, while the rest of you has not yet determined itself to act. You are “drawn out of yourself.” I then address initial worries about my view, namely that it is objectionably dualistic, metaphorical, or biological.

The Low Road

In this chapter, I address the last constraint, asymmetric pressure. How is it that your inclination can put asymmetric pressure on your will? I argue that this is a deep and general problem, one that familiar theories of strength and weakness of will tend to elide. What, in principle, could pressure a free will? My Kantian claim is that the only thing that can pressure a free will is the burden of freedom itself. Inclinations, as such, cannot pressure the will. But if their nature is as I have described, they provide us with the opportunity to flee our freedom, by providing us with an animal mind to flee into. Instead of humanizing our incentive, we dehumanize ourselves. Similarly, I argue, we can be weak in relation to our social environment. Social scripts do not pressure us directly, but they give us the opportunity to flee into automaticity.