Theoretical Notes on Action Schemes in Society

This essay presents theoretical constructs for characterizing the causal structure of social actions and developing a multi-level theory of action relating to accomplishment of goals via social organizations. Focal concepts include: action schemes, mobilization, internal and external fulfillments, power schemes, macroactions, effective actions, and purposeful actions. Additionally, an overview is provided of a methodological procedure for analyzing narratives in order to specify causal linkages among actions and thereby delineate action schemes. Some possibilities for future developments are noted.

Action without Intention: Some Remarks of Analytical Philosophy Applied to the Theory of Social Action

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

The thermodynamic theory of action potential propagation: a sound basis for unification of the physics of nerve impulses

The thermodynamic theory of action potential propagation challenges the conventional understanding of the nerve signal as an exclusively electrical phenomenon. Often misunderstood as to its basic tenets and predictions, the thermodynamic theory is virtually ignored in mainstream neuroscience. Addressing a broad audience of neuroscientists, we here attempt to stimulate interest in the theory. We do this by providing a concise overview of its background, discussion of its intimate connection to Albert Einstein’s treatment of the thermodynamics of interfaces and outlining its potential contribution to the building of a physical brain theory firmly grounded in first principles and the biophysical reality of individual nerve cells. As such, the paper does not attempt to advocate the superiority of the thermodynamic theory over any other approach to model the nerve impulse, but is meant as an open invitation to the neuroscience community to experimentally test the assumptions and predictions of the theory on their validity.

Instructionally Embedded Assessment: Theory of Action for an Innovative System

Policy shifts in the United States are beginning to reduce the emphasis on using statewide assessment results primarily for accountability and teacher evaluation. Increasingly, there are calls for and interest in innovative and flexible assessments that shift the purposes of assessment and use of results toward instructional planning and student learning. Under the Innovative Assessment Demonstration Authority, some states are exploring options for replacing traditional large-scale summative assessments with innovative measures. However, many of these programs are still in early phases of planning and research and have not yet fully articulated how the innovative system achieves desired outcomes. This conceptual paper presents an argument in the form of a theory of action for a flexible and innovative assessment system already in operational use. The system replaces traditional summative assessments with large-scale through-year Instructionally Embedded assessments. We describe the components of the theory of action, detailing the theoretical model and supporting literature that illustrate how system design, delivery, and scoring contribute to the intended outcomes of teachers using assessment results to inform instruction and having higher expectations for student achievement, in addition to accountability uses. We share considerations for others developing innovative assessment systems to meet stakeholders’ needs.

Two Accounts of the Problem of Enhanced Control

According to event-causal libertarianism, an action is free in the sense relevant to moral responsibility when it is caused indeterministically by an agent’s beliefs, desires, intentions, or by their occurrences. This paper attempts to clarify one of the major objections to this theory: the objection that the theory cannot explain the relevance of indeterminism to this kind of freedom (known as free will). Christopher Evan Franklin (2011, 2018) has argued that the problem of explaining the relevance of indeterminism to free will (which he calls “the problem of enhanced control”) arises because it is difficult to see how indeterminism could enhance our abilities, and disappears when we realize that beside the relevant abilities free will requires opportunities. In this paper, I argue that the problem occurs not because of the focus on abilities, but because of the difficulty to explain how indeterminism could contribute to the satisfaction of the sourcehood condition of free will in the framework of event-causal theory of action.