Designing a Deliberative Peace Referendum

Author(s):  
Levy O’Flynn.

This chapter outlines the generic Deliberative Peace Referendum model. We introduce key innovations such as a modestly coercive referendum ballot design that encourages public-reason based deliberation. We also point to more established institutional options (eg, mini-publics) and where these may fit the referendum process. The generic Deliberative Peace Referendum model is amendable to modification, especially in light of the various types of conflict in which it may apply.

Methodology ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Krebs ◽  
Juergen H.P. Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik

To examine whether starting a response scale with the positive or the negative categories affects response behavior, a split-ballot design using reverse forms of an 8-point scale assessing the subjective importance of job characteristics was used. Response behavior varied according to the scale format employed. Responses were more positive on the scale starting with the category “very important” (split 2). By contrast, the scale starting with the category “not at all important” (split 1) did not elicit more negative responses, but rather less positive ones. However, differences in response behavior did not systematically reflect the direction of the respective scales. Starting with the differences between the two split versions, the factorial structure of indicators assessing two dimensions of job motivation was tested for each scale type separately and then for both scale types simultaneously. Finally, models placing increasingly severe equality constraints on both scale types were tested. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results and desiderata for further research.


Author(s):  
Douglas I. Thompson

Montaigne offers what is perhaps the first historical instance of the now-ubiquitous phrase “public reason.” Whereas contemporary use of this phrase refers to activities of moral reason-giving, Montaigne uses it to refer to the health of public institutions, conventions, and activities that allow parties in potential and actual conflict to negotiate civil peace and other public goods, whether through moral reasoning, strategic bargaining, or other forms of interaction. This chapter engages with two recent instances of Montaignian public reason in action: the local negotiation of “civil alliance” between Jews and Arabs in the lands of the Palestinian Mandate in 1947–1948 and the negotiation of conflict resolution during an armed standoff between the Canadian army and Mohawk warriors outside Montréal, Quebec in the summer of 1990.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter critically engages with the “sex work” approach to prostitution and argues that treating “sex work” like any other form of work is neither possible nor compatible with valuing the freedom and equality of women as citizens. Liberals often claim, erroneously, that liberalism’s commitment to a kind of neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life and its commitment to antipaternalism requires either decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. While arguments that rest on a particular conception of the “good” of sex or of the role of sex in a broader conception of the good are illegitimate grounds for state policy, it is argued that there are, nonetheless, good public reason arguments against decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. A defense of the Nordic model is offered.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter discusses the concern that exclusive accounts of public reason threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens in democratic societies. It discusses various notions of integrity that might be claimed to ground such a concern. It is argued that purely formal accounts of integrity that do not distinguish between the integrity of reasonable and unreasonable persons, as specified within political liberalism, cannot underwrite integrity challenges that should concern political liberals. It is further argued that if the inquiry is limited to conceptions of integrity that distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons, the supposed burdens persons of faith face are not burdens different from those that all citizens face equally. It is claimed the concern is best understood as a challenge to the account of public justification and the account of public reason as a moral ideal.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.


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