The Six Perfections in the Mahāyāna

This chapter addresses ethical theory of the Mahāyāna tradition specifically, giving a brief background on its origin and framework. The chapter then focuses on the six perfections, or moral qualities, that are adumbrated in the account of the bodhisattva path. The six perfections are generosity, proper conduct (śīla), patience, effort, meditation, and wisdom. The chapter also addresses the elevation of karuṇā (care), one of the brahmavihāras, to its status as the central moral quality, and discusses the installation of the bodhisattva, a being who forgoes personal liberation order to facilitate the liberation of all others, as the moral ideal

MORAL IDEAL-BASED QUR`AN INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO SHĀṬIBĪ’S CONCEPT OF MAQĀṢID AL-SHARĪ’AH

The interpretation of the Qur`an has been frequently subjected to exploring legal aspects of verses, regardless of their underlying ethical bases. The goals of Islamic doctrines called as maqāṣid al-sharī'ah provide ethical judgements that can be functioned for this sake. Unfortunately, they have been applied just for legal formulation. This article employs Fazlur Rahman’s theory of distinction between legal-specific and moral-ideal of Qur`anic doctrines. This perspective will be used to analyze moral dimensions of Shāṭibī’s maqāṣid. In this article, it will be argued that the moral principles extracted from these goals can be functioned as the paradigm for interpreting the Qur`an. There are two models of moral value-based interpretation that can be developed. The first is ethical-historical interpretation. This interpretation aims to understand the verses of the Qur'an in the light of a historical context as the starting point, not only based on background or reason behind the verse that respond the historical situation, but also based on the moral message extracted from these ends. The second is the ethic-contextual interpretation. It is an interpretation that is projected to respond current issues by applying three interacting sides; present situations, the literary context, and the ideal-moral paradigm drawn from these ends.

Should Criminal Law Mirror Moral Blameworthiness or Criminal Culpability? A Reply to Husak

In Ignorance of Law, Doug Husak defends a version of legal moralism on which ‘we should recognize a presumption that the criminal law should…be based, on conform to, or mirror critical morality’. Here I explore whether substantive criminal law rules should directly mirror not moral blameworthiness, but a distinct legal notion of criminal culpability – akin to moral blameworthiness but refined for deployment in legal systems. Contra Husak, I argue that the criminal law departing from the moral ideal embodied in the standard of moral blameworthiness is not always to be regretted. After showing how criminal culpability might come apart from moral blameworthiness, I argue that my alternative to Husak’s view has practically interesting upshots. In particular, it allows us to resist Husak’s central conclusions about the exculpatory force of normative ignorance. There are good reasons for the criminal law to make certain charitable presumptions about citizens as competent agents, which the standard of moral blameworthiness needn’t similarly embody, and this calls into question Husak’s argument for the claim that normative ignorance exculpates.

The dream of Pencho Slaveykov and the metamorphosis of poet’s idea

After the middle of the 19th century, secular culture and literature were constituted, which separated them from Christianity. The poet’s figure is developed in the cultural field. In Petko Slaveykov's lyrics, the poet serves his fellows, dedicating himself and his “singing” to the collective and the national idea. In the age of modernism, subjectivism and anthropocentrism dominate. In Pencho Slaveykov’s view, the poet must follow his personal, individual, unique, unrepeated soul path in wandering, in trouble, in solitude. He does not think of earthly glory but of life after death. Through the categories of modernism, Pencho Slaveykov reconsiders and resemantizes the poet’s figure and behavior. The poet is a leader. He serves the others while following his path of the chosen one, of the prophet of a moral ideal.

Judicial Review of Legislation in the UK: Fundamental Common Law Principles as "Constitutional Principles" Limiting the Sovereignty of Parliament?

<p>The aim of this paper is to explore the role of judicial review of legislation in the UK from a legal constitutionalist’s point of view. After having introduced the reader to the origins of judicial review of legislation in general and the two theoretical models of constitutionalism, the UK’s system of constitutionalism will be analysed in particular. In this context, the process of “juridification” and “judicalisation” will be discussed in order to show that the British doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - famously articulated by Dicey in 1885 - is currently under attack. The main focus of this research paper is on the theory of common law constitutionalism (CLC theory), according to which the common law is seen as constituting a higher order of law, a moral ideal and a superior form of public reason, and therefore the ultimate controlling factor of Parliament’s actions. On the basis of the academic theory, the judicial reception of this theory will be analysed with particular attention to the House of Lords’ decision in Jackson in 2005. It will be argued that the system of the common law constitutionalism in the UK is not very different from the system of legal constitutionalism: Firstly, fundamental principles embedded in the common law like the rule of law are similar to constitutional principles of codified supreme constitutions, providing for benchmarks of judicial review of legislation. Secondly, the requirement of exceptional circumstances for invalidating legislation in the CLC system corresponds to the idea of (strong) judicial self-restraint in legal constitutionalist systems.</p>

Judicial Review of Legislation in the UK: Fundamental Common Law Principles as "Constitutional Principles" Limiting the Sovereignty of Parliament?

<p>The aim of this paper is to explore the role of judicial review of legislation in the UK from a legal constitutionalist’s point of view. After having introduced the reader to the origins of judicial review of legislation in general and the two theoretical models of constitutionalism, the UK’s system of constitutionalism will be analysed in particular. In this context, the process of “juridification” and “judicalisation” will be discussed in order to show that the British doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - famously articulated by Dicey in 1885 - is currently under attack. The main focus of this research paper is on the theory of common law constitutionalism (CLC theory), according to which the common law is seen as constituting a higher order of law, a moral ideal and a superior form of public reason, and therefore the ultimate controlling factor of Parliament’s actions. On the basis of the academic theory, the judicial reception of this theory will be analysed with particular attention to the House of Lords’ decision in Jackson in 2005. It will be argued that the system of the common law constitutionalism in the UK is not very different from the system of legal constitutionalism: Firstly, fundamental principles embedded in the common law like the rule of law are similar to constitutional principles of codified supreme constitutions, providing for benchmarks of judicial review of legislation. Secondly, the requirement of exceptional circumstances for invalidating legislation in the CLC system corresponds to the idea of (strong) judicial self-restraint in legal constitutionalist systems.</p>

PHILOSOPHY OF GANDHI: VIEWS ON RELIGION AND GOD

Religion, according to Gandhi, is more or less, a way of life, and as such is the personal concern of the individual who has to choose his way of life. Gandhi believes that different religions are the different ways of apprehending the Truth. The basic conviction of Gandhi is that there is one reality – that of God, which is nothing else but Truth. His religious ideas are also derived from that conviction. If Truth is God, sincere pursuit of Truth is religion. Religion is ordinarily defined as devotion to some higher power or principle, Gandhi is not against such a description of religion, he only qualifies it further by saying that higher principle being truth, devotion to Truth (or God) is religion. Gandhi believes that true religion has to be practical. Therefore, he says that religion should pervade every aspect of our life. Religion is the belief that there is an ordered moral government of the universe, and this belief must have practical bearings for all aspects of life. According to Gandhi there is no difference between religious ideal and metaphysical or moral ideal, the religious way is also the way of truth – Sathyagraha. This paper discuss about Gandhi’s ideas of God, religion, the way of religion and the religious harmony in the world.

Truth. The socio-legal and religious-moral ideal of Ancient Russia (XI-XVII centuries). Historical and philosophical research

The monograph is devoted to the ideas of the ancient Russian man about the religious, moral and socio-legal values associated with the word "truth". The author analyzes the context of the use of the word "truth" in a variety of historical sources before the XVII century, and on this basis, a conclusion is made not just about the meanings of this word, but about the most significant values and ideals that the Old Russian man expressed through the corresponding term. It is addressed to a wide range of readers interested in the history of religious, moral and socio-legal ideas. It can be useful for students, postgraduates and teachers of historical, political, philosophical and law faculties of universities.

Democratization - the moral ideal of cultural policy. A philosophical revision of the Social Critique of the Power of Judgment of P. Bourdieu

Democratization has become the unknowingly accepted moral ideal of cultural policy. It is more or less consciously based on Pierre Bourdieu’s postulate to abolish the Kantian distinction between pure and barbaric taste. A closer analysis of theoretical assumptions and cultural practice shows that the ideal expressed and applied in this form is internally contradictory, and it certainly cannot be universally applied in all areas of culture. The correct articulation of the ideal of democratization cannot be based on negating the Kantian aesthetics, but, on the contrary, requires its rehabilitation in the direction that was set, among others, by Herbert Marcuse. The article presents non-dogmatic arguments for maintaining the elitist nature of the activities of legitimate institutions of artistic culture. If democratization is to constitute a real (i.e. consistent with its concept) moral ideal, then the autonomy of high culture works in its favor.

I Have Learned to Be Content

Chapter 4 takes up Paul’s assertion in Philippians 4:11 that he is satisfied (autarkēs) even in prison. Although often read in relation to Stoic ideals, Paul’s claim in fact reflects a much more broadly attested moral ideal; philosophical discourses of autarky are not its source but coincidental products. Comparison with modern prison writing and ethnography invites a redescription of Paul’s rhetoric as an affective practice of survivalist dissent. As with other prisoners, for Paul to assert that he is satisfied in prison is to exercise his residual agency and thus perform an unabjected self, even as the hard somatic fact of his deprivation leaves him eager for relief and dependent on his Philippian addressees.