The Basic Conception of Epistêmê at Work

If epistêmê’s defining object is Being, then cognition of Being constitutes Plato’s basic conception of epistêmê: we should be able to appeal to this in order to see why Plato attributes to epistêmê all the various features that he does. In this chapter I aim to show that this expectation is borne out. The Basic Conception can explain the requirement that epistêmê is of truth, that it involves the ability to give explanations, and that it is clear, precise, and stable. Moreover, it can explain and indeed motivate all the evidence that epistêmê is restricted to Forms. What about the objection, however, that the Republic’s philosophers’ epistêmê qualifies them to rule, and hence must apply to perceptibles? I argue that Plato provides a clear solution: since perceptibles are images of Forms, epistêmê of the Forms enhances one’s cognition of perceptibles without directly applying to them.