Global Financial Crisis

Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

Many have suggested that the Global Financial Crisis was an accident waiting to happen, being the result of trends dating from the 1970s. However, these same trends provided the global financial system with a high degree of resilience. The depth and breadth of global financial markets, the size and scale of the megabanks, and the use of derivatives, all provided a means of coping with the instabilities inherent in market economies. In addition, central banks, acting collectively, had perfected rules of behaviour that were applied to systemically important banks and so reduced the level of risk that they were exposed to. Securitization and the operation of the originate-and-distribute model of banking had removed the threat of a liquidity crisis. Regulatory agencies were also in place that supervised financial systems, and so were in a position to identify and deal with any signs of impending difficulty. This removed the threat of a solvency crisis for any systemically important institution. Under these circumstances a crisis of the magnitude of the one that took place in 2008 was considered impossible. But the impossible happened. However, the crisis was a rolling affair, beginning in 2007, creating ample opportunity for intervention to prevent it having the consequences it did.

Author(s):  
Huck-ju Kwon

One of the biggest challenges for developing a new more productivist social policy approach has been the apparent absence of a new, post-neoliberal, economic model even after the global financial crisis. This chapter explores the social policy implications of the official ‘pragmatism’ of the new economic model with its ‘institutionalist’ emphases on nation states finding what works best in their own contexts rather than looking to the one size fits all approach of recent decades.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 416
Author(s):  
Anjali Karol

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 has been the most severe global shock after the Great Depression of the 1930s. A crisis of this order has changed the outlook on international socio-economic integration and concerns on financial security and global polity. As we are a decade after the crisis, it is instinctively imperative to relook and analyse the lessons learnt and the policy responses that helped ease the crisis. This paper is an attempt in that direction. Research over the years suggests that global financial system has evolved into a more innocuous network at limited unintended costs. Globally policy regulations have tightened to lessen the impact of future crises and today most countries have some form of macro-prudential surveillance.


Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

The shock to the global financial system in 2020, caused by the coronavirus, provides is a test for the measures taken since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The coronavirus has caused a shock to the global economic system, disrupting both supply and demand, and this demands more direct government intervention than central banks are able to provide. Whereas the 2008 crisis was one centred on the global banking system that of 2020 was an event akin to a war, natural disaster, or a political revolution. In turn that had implications for the global financial system as it contained the potential to destabilize banks by threatening the solvency of those to whom they had made loans and extended credit. To forestall such an event central banks are called upon to act as lenders of last resort, particularly the Federal Reserve, as it was the only one capable of supplying the US$s on which all banks relied when making and receiving payments, and borrowing and lending, among themselves. From the outset that response appears to have learned lessons from the mistakes of the 2008 crisis, in terms of speed, scale, and co-ordination, while the global banking system is far more resilient.


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