The international financial architecture (IFA) can be viewed as a landscape crowded with different international bodies that share responsibilities for the prevention of global financial instability. These bodies include international organizations (IOs), such as the international financial institutions (IFIs) (e.g. the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank), intergovernmental fora (e.g. the G7, G10, and G20), and transnational networks of regulators and supervisors (such as the Bank for International Settlements [BIS] and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS]). This chapter examines the dispersion of governance functions in the IFA. It focuses on the relationship between two key bodies — the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the IMF — and applies the insights of the IO literature to illuminate the sources of organizational conflict between the two bodies. It argues that the problems in the FSB-IMF working relationship can be attributed to the different terms of their delegations, memberships, and organizational cultures. These factors, in turn, can be explained by the insights of the rationalist, realist, and constructivist frameworks.
Borio, Claudio u. a. (Hrsg.): Promoting Global Monetary and Financial Stability. The Bank for International Settlements after Bretton Woods, 1973–2020, 302 S., Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2020.