Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and Future Use20023Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and Future Use. Belgium: Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP)563pp., ISBN: 1 874719 41 1 £40.00/US$75.00

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-299
Author(s):  
Patrick ten Brink
Author(s):  
Albert Weale ◽  
Geoffrey Pridham ◽  
Michelle Cini ◽  
Dimitrios Konstadakopulos ◽  
Martin Porter ◽  
...  

2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN R. COPELAND

This paper develops a simple model to investigate linkages between trade and environmental policy. In the case of purely local pollution, trade liberalization without constraints on environmental policy induces a non-cooperative game between countries in pollution policy. Without any agreement on environmental policy, trade negotiations are unlikely to lead to a point on the Pareto frontier. When pollution is global, countries may be expected to disagree on linkages between trade agreements and environmental agreements. Countries importing pollution-intensive goods have an incentive to try to link trade agreements with environmental agreements, while countries exporting pollution-intensive goods have an incentive to try to obtain a binding commitment to free trade prior to negotiations over global pollution.


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